

OVERSIGHT OF THE URBAN AREA SECURITY INITIATIVE GRANT PROGRAM

JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC ASSETS AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION

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OVERSIGHT OF THE URBAN AREA SECURITY INITIATIVE GRANT PROGRAM

Friday, July 15, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND PUBLIC
ASSETS, JOINT WITH THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
SECURITY
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:03 a.m., in Room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. John L. Mica [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Mica, DeSantis, Turner, Palmer, Meadows, and Lynch.

Mr. MICA. Good morning. I'd like to welcome everyone this morning to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. This morning we're actually conducting a joint hearing with the Subcommittees on Transportation and Public Assets and also the National Security Subcommittee. The title of the hearing this morning is—and subject, is Addressing Oversight of the Urban Area Security Initiative Grant Program.

I probably can't start this hearing without just maybe a moment of silence both to remember the 49 individuals who were killed in Orlando, and then as we all saw last night in Nice, our great allies, the French, lost some 84 people. So we'll just take a minute and pause here and remember those folks.

[Moment of silence.]

Mr. MICA. Thank you. It's quite fitting that we do meet today to discuss one of the government programs that tries to deal with the terrorist threat. I'd like to thank our witnesses for being with us and the members attending this morning.

First I want to say that the Subcommittee on Transportation and Public Assets and the Subcommittee on National Security will order, without objection, and the chair does state at this point that he is authorized to declare a recess at any time in this hearing.

Now, the order of business will be as follows. We will have opening statements from the members that are here, then we will introduce our witnesses, witnesses will be sworn. Each of them will testify. After we have those introductions and testimony, we will go to questions. We'll wait on having questioning until we've heard from all of the witnesses.

So with that, I want to welcome again everyone, particularly our witnesses, and I'll start with my opening statement.

Again, we come together to look at a Federal program that is designed to help our local and State governments deal with the terrorist threat that our Nation and the world is facing right now. This program, which is the Urban Security Initiative, was established after 9/11 to aid our State and local governments, and particularly our first responders, with giving them Federal assistance, because they are our first line of defense in terrorism, and providing Federal grants.

Over the last few years, we've given on average a billion dollars a year on these grants to State and local governments. Unfortunately, I had the experience of working with some of my local governments in Orlando, and my district 3 years ago was changed to represent more of the urban core of Orlando, and at that time I got a chance to hear from both the sheriff of Orange County and also the police chief, John Mina, who are two of our witnesses today. They told me there was something wrong with the assessment under this program that's conducted by DHS and FEMA, and they told me that our Central Florida area had the risk assessment changed, in fact, lowered, and it was lowered so much that, in fact, they were denied Federal assistance under the program that was designed to give them additional resources to deal with the terrorism threat.

So unfortunately, the Federal Government failed. We won't get into other failures of the Federal Government we've heard about, by Federal law enforcement and other agencies, but today we're going to focus on the issue of the failure, the dramatic failure of missing the target in Orlando, Florida, in that particular instance.

And then this isn't just a criticism of that particular failure. This is also an effort to find out how we can make our communities safer, how we can make this program work better, and how we can get the resources to those who are on the first line of defense, and do that in an orderly and more effective and targeted fashion.

Unfortunately, again, working with this issue even before the horrible events that took place in Orlando, with Sheriff Demings and Chief Mina, we wrote to and appealed the decisions by FEMA and DHS, saying that Orlando had a significant security terrorist risk threat. Each time, we were denied.

I have to put up on the screen my comments on January 27th of this year. In the next to last sentence, I wrote Secretary Johnson and I said, "If Central Florida became a target, it would be a national disaster." Those were my words to the Secretary back then.

Since DHS and also FEMA would not change their assessment, we moved forward. And even before, again, the horrible Pulse massacre, we began changing legislative language. I'd like to submit for the record also language that we have included in the DHS appropriations bill, and that's both legislative language and report language to make changes in this program, get back to Congress some of the data and information and assessment prior to it becoming effective. So without objection, we'll put that in the record.

Since, again, the horrible events in Orlando, our committee and subcommittees have conducted an investigation. Let me just go over briefly and conclude with some of our findings. Some of this is astounding. Of the money since 2011, almost half of the Urban Area Security Initiative funds, almost half of these funds are unex-

pended. We have a slide here that shows \$1.1 billion of the \$2.8 billion in these awards, or about 40 percent, remain unexpended. It's stunning that while Orlando got no money the last 2 years, there are unexpended funds, now listen to this, from Boston, 2011, \$591,000, in New York City, \$11 and a half million since 2012 sitting idle, Los Angeles, sitting idle, \$18, almost \$19 million, and since 2014, \$68 million sitting idle. Tampa, which was one of the recipients and Miami are the two that received awards in Florida, Tampa had \$170,000 left over from 2014.

So we're going to need to look at how we get this money distributed, how it doesn't sit idle, particularly when we have the terrorist threat that we have today.

This grant program has awarded \$8.2 billion since 2003. Also we found in our investigation, and reviewed, 2012 is the most recent support, but we found expenditures that weren't justified in this program. Michigan bought 13 snow cone machines; in Ohio, we saw funds from their award given to support a 5-day spa junket featuring the actors on "The Apocalypse". These are just a couple of examples that we found of wasteful spending in the program.

So we are in fact asking today, and I'll ask with—Chairman Chaffetz has agreed to ask and we will have a letter that we'll submit later in the record for review by the inspector general of three areas, both looking at the assessment area, looking at unexpended funds, and then thirdly, at wasteful spending. We need an update and we need that now.

So, again, we know that Orlando had received money before, was denied money the last 2 years. We do know that Orlando and Central Florida used money on equipment, training, readiness exercises, and communications systems, and other things that probably could have helped. Would it have stopped this terrorist attack? We don't know that, but, again, it's our job to make certain that these Federal resources are used in a proper manner.

So those are some of the things that we found. We've tried to warn FEMA. We tried to correct this before this took place. That didn't happen. Now with the threat that we face in our community and across the Nation, as we've seen we're all vulnerable, we've got to do a better job.

I thank you again as witnesses for coming today. Let me yield to Mr. Lynch, our ranking member.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Chairman DeSantis. And to our witnesses, Sheriff Demings, thank you so much, Chief Mina, thanks for coming up from Florida. We appreciate it. And Mr. Purdy and Mr. Kamoie. Is that the right pronunciation, Kamoie?

Mr. KAMOIE. It is.

Mr. LYNCH. Or is it close enough?

Mr. KAMOIE. It is, Congressman. Thank you.

Mr. LYNCH. You're sure? Okay. All right. Thanks for being here.

Mr. Chairman, at the outset, I want to join you in my thoughts and prayers for the people of Nice, France, the victims, their loved ones, and all those affected by the horrific terrorist attacks in southern France yesterday. This is the third major terrorist attack in France in the last 19 months. The State Department has confirmed that the victims include two American citizens. They are

Sean Copeland and his 11-year-old son, Brody. They are from the Austin, Texas, area. And our hearts and prayers go out to the Copeland family and the people of Texas.

Mr. Chairman, again, I think this hearing is especially important in the wake of the horrific attacks in Orlando, and we continue to grieve and to pray for the victims' families in Orlando as well.

I'd like to thank both committees for participating in this hearing. And I do want to say that, Sheriff Demings and Chief Mina, we have heard, it has been widely communicated that your activities and your loyal, dedicated service has been a blessing before and after and during the attacks in Orlando, and I think that experience makes you especially valuable in terms of your perspective on how we might more effectively allocate the resources, substantial resources that we have out there, especially with these urban area grants.

The Urban Area Security Initiative, also known as UASI, is one of the three programs that make up the Federal Emergency Management Agency Homeland Security grant program, and they collectively provide vital Federal funding to States and localities to prevent and respond to potential terrorist attacks and other emergencies.

We have had our own struggles with this program in the city of Boston and the greater Boston area. I think we were helped, ironically, because of the fact that we had the attacks during the marathon, and that the realization of vulnerability and the threat assessment in that area gave us leverage, but we were not always recognized as an area that needed this funding. And there are several cities that, because of the factors that are applied in these allocations, there are other cities across the country, San Antonio, I know, in Texas has also been dropped from the list, and there's got to be a better way for us to recognize and do this threat analysis so that places like Orlando and Central Florida will receive the funding that they need.

The purpose of the urban area security grant is to assist cities in their anti-terrorism preparedness and response efforts. In particular, the program provides financial assistance to address the planning activities, organizational resources, equipment, training and exercise needs of the high-threat, high-density urban areas. That's right from the statute.

As Representative for the Eighth Congressional District of Massachusetts, including Boston, Quincy, Brockton, and 21 other towns, I can tell you that nearly \$18 million that the Boston area received in Urban Area Security Initiative funding proved critical in the aftermath of the devastating Boston Marathon bombings in April of 2013. As reported by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in its July 2013 testimony before the U.S. Senate on Lessons Learned from the Marathon Bombing, UASI funding helped to secure onsite security and protection, bomb robots, x-ray equipment, and ballistic helmets and vests that were used during the event.

Program grant funds also helped to provide regional mutual and radio systems to increase information sharing between law enforcement, fire service, and emergency medical services. This funding supported the Boston Regional Intelligence Center's work on bomb-

ing-related operations and analysis, and provided camera systems that were used for post-incident investigation. Moreover, the Boston area directed Urban Area Security Initiative funds, to train SWAT teams, was critical in our ability to integrate bomb technicians into law enforcement, tactical operations, which was a crucial capability that was demonstrated following the marathon bombings, according to FEMA.

Given the importance of Urban Area Security Initiative grants to the antiterrorism preparedness and response efforts in our cities, it is imperative that we conduct meaningful oversight of the program in order to ensure that no city, no city is arbitrarily or unjustifiably denied this assistance.

It is my understanding that while the Orlando area study steadily indicated that the Orlando area was to receive nearly \$45 million in UASI funding from 2004 to 2012, the area did not qualify for assistance in 2013, 2015, and 2016. For a metropolitan area that just last month experienced a tragic terrorist attack perpetrated by a shooter, Omar Mateen, who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, and the presence of a major densely settled population, a lot of people, a lot of tourist activity in Orlando, the absence of an Urban Area Security Initiative assistance grant certainly merits re-examination.

I would note that a primary reason behind Orlando's loss of funding from year to year is that Congress has imposed some additional guidance and restrictions when it comes to determinations made by the Department of Homeland Security to distribute urban area grants. In three of the last five appropriations cycles, Congress added report language to the annual Department of Homeland Security appropriations bill that required the agency to place greater weight on certain risk and vulnerability criteria. Regrettably, these restrictions have resulted in a loss of funding for several cities, including Orlando. Other large and highly populated metropolitan areas include Kansas City, Sacramento, California, and San Antonio, Texas, as I mentioned before. These cities have also lost urban area initiative funding in the past. So hopefully we'll be able—through the re-examination of what happened in Orlando, we might be able to help those localities as well.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to discussing with the witnesses what steps we can take to further strengthen the Urban Area Security Initiative training program. And I thank you for the time. I yield back.

Mr. MICA. Well, I thank you, Mr. Lynch, as the ranking member too of the National Security Subcommittee, and particularly I want to thank Congressman DeSantis, who chairs the Subcommittee on National Security, for their cooperative effort on this hearing and on this matter.

Let me now recognize the chairman of the National Security Subcommittee, my colleague from Florida, Mr. DeSantis.

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for spearheading this hearing and thank you for raising the alarm about the need to protect Central Florida.

Terrorism's on the march. Last month's attack in Orlando was the deadliest attack in the United States since September 11, 2001, and, of course, last night terrorists mowed down more than 80 peo-

ple in Nice, France, by running them over with a truck. Our Homeland Security efforts must adapt to this growing threat, a threat posed by what is a global jihad.

As Chairman Mica mentioned, despite numerous appeals from Orlando officials and Chairman Mica himself, the Department of Homeland Security and Federal Emergency Management Agency denied Urban Area Security Initiative funding to Orlando for the last 2 years, and has only allocated \$1 million in the last 4 years. FEMA's reasoning was that the terrorists were unlikely to attack Orlando, but FEMA was wrong.

The Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Emergency Management Agency must allocate preparedness funding in a way that recognizes recent terrorist trends, specifically FEMA must change its risk ranking methodology and needs to listen to the appeals of cities that are closest to the threat. They're on the ground, they're the first responders, they know what the risk is.

People pour into Central Florida every year, and the greater Orlando area contains a number of so-called soft targets, such as amusement parks, which see large numbers of people congregate in one location. Suicidal terrorists seek out soft targets because it allows them to inflict a large amount of damage in a relatively short period of time. The Orlando area is at risk, and we need the government's methodology to reflect this fact.

I agree with law enforcement personnel from Central Florida, including Sheriff Demings that the relative risk score for Orlando should also include Volusia and Brevard Counties. A cohesive strategy that includes these counties, both of whom sent assistance following the terrorist attack at the Pulse nightclub, will better protect communities in Central Florida, and UASI funding should recognize this.

I look forward to hearing from Sheriff Demings and Chief Mina on their appeals to the Federal Government and how UASI funding can help Orlando. These are very busy and trying times for law enforcement, and I appreciate Sheriff Demings and Chief Mina testifying today.

And I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate, again, the National Security Subcommittee cooperating on this hearing.

We will hold the record open for 5 legislative days for any members who would like to submit a written statement for this hearing.

I'd now like to recognize and introduce our witnesses. I'm pleased to welcome from Central Florida, Sheriff Jerry Demings of Orange County, Florida. He heads our sheriff's office. He's also distinguished by just being named the President of the Florida Sheriffs Association. Welcome, Sheriff Demings.

Then we have Chief John Mina. John Mina probably is known across the country, both Sheriff Demings and Chief Mina, for what they've been through, just unbelievable nightmare in our community, and he leads that force with distinction, the City of Orlando police chief.

We have Walter Purdy, who's President of the Terrorism Research Center. Welcome.

And then we have Mr. Brian Kamoie, Assistant Administrator for Grant Programs at FEMA, the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

Gentlemen, this is an investigations and oversight committee of Congress. We do require that all of our witnesses be sworn. If you'd please stand, I'll administer the oath. Raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you're about to give to this joint subcommittee hearing of Congress is the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

Let the record reflect that all of the witnesses answered in the affirmative. Thank you.

Some of you are new to the congressional hearing process. We try to get you to submit anything you'd like for the record, like the statement documentation. We'd like to have you summarize in about 5 minutes your key points and then we can get to questions.

So with that, we'll first turn to our Federal witness, Mr. Kamoie, with FEMA. And FEMA—again, the order of this, the investigational review—Mr. DeSantis, Mr. Lynch oversee the National Security Subcommittee, and they oversee DHS, but in this program, this urban area terrorism risk assessment, FEMA actually conducts the assessment. And, in fact, we'll put in the record reference to their response to me after Central Florida was denied back in January, and multiple times their response on behalf of DHS.

Mr. MICA. So with that introduction, let me welcome Mr. Kamoie, the representative from FEMA, to testify.

WITNESS STATEMENTS

STATEMENT OF BRIAN E. CAMOIE

Mr. KAMOIE. Thank you very much, Chairman Mica, Chairman DeSantis, and members of the subcommittee. Good morning. I'm Brian Kamoie, Assistant Administrator for Grant Programs at FEMA. On behalf of Secretary Jeh Johnson and Administrator Craig Fugate, thank you for the opportunity to discuss DHS and FEMA's efforts to assist our State and local partners to prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks.

The recent shootings in Dallas and Orlando and last night's tragedy in Nice, France, are reminders of just how important it is for our Nation to be ready to respond to all types of hazards, including manmade threats. Our thoughts and prayers are with the victims of these tragic events, as well as with the law enforcement officers who risk their lives every day to protect our communities, including Sheriff Demings, Chief Mina, and their officers.

Today I will outline some of FEMA's programs to provide first responders with the resources they need to prevent these events and to plan, equip, and train for them should they occur. I will also discuss how we've supported Orlando through these programs before and after the shooting at the Pulse nightclub on June 12.

Thanks to your support, since 2002, Congress, through the Department of Homeland Security, has awarded more than \$47 billion in preparedness funding to State and local governments and to a broad array of Homeland Security partners. In fiscal year 2016, more than \$1 billion was awarded to our partners through the Homeland Security Grant Program, or HSGP, to build a more se-

cure and resilient Nation. The HSGP includes three programs: the State Homeland Security Program, the Urban Area Security Initiative, or UASI, and the Operation Stonegarden Program.

This year, the State Homeland Security Grant Program provides \$402 million to support preparedness capabilities, with more than \$11 million allocated to Florida. Florida also received more than \$1.3 million through the Operation Stonegarden Program to enhance the security of the Nation's borders.

Each year, DHS prioritizes UASI funds by conducting a risk assessment of the 100 most populous metropolitan statistical areas, as required by the Homeland Security Act. The annual assessment is based on three key factors for each urban area: relative threat, vulnerability, and consequences from acts of terrorism. Threat scores are derived from intelligence data compiled by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis. This information includes data on any acts of terrorism, disrupted plots, credible threats, and known or suspected terrorist presence in each urban area.

Vulnerability scores take into consideration any infrastructure that is a potentially high value target for terrorists, as well as any border crossings.

Finally, consequence scores factor in an urban area's population, economic, national infrastructure, and national security indices. The results of the risk assessment, including the scores and relative ranking, inform the Secretary's decisions regarding eligible urban areas and funding allocations.

Orlando received more than \$44 and a half million in total UASI funding from fiscal years 2003 to 2012. In 2013, Congress for the first time directed DHS to limit the number of jurisdictions funded under the program to 25 in order to focus resources in the highest risk urban areas. Orlando had a relative risk rank of 30 that year and, as a result, did not receive funding.

In 2014, Congress lifted the restriction on the total number of urban areas that DHS could fund under the program. That year, Secretary Johnson exercised his discretion and funded 39 areas, including Orlando, which was ranked 33rd, and received \$1 million.

In the annual DHS appropriations acts for fiscal years 2015 and 2016, Congress again directed DHS to restrict funding to the urban areas that represent up to 85 percent of the assessed nationwide risk of terrorism. Secretary Johnson followed that direction, and designated 28 urban areas as eligible for UASI funding in 2015, and in 29 areas in 2016. Orlando fell outside the funded range in both of those years, ranking 32 in 2015 and 34 in 2016.

Though not currently eligible for dedicated UASI funding, Orlando can still receive funding support through the State Homeland Security Program. HSGP funds awarded to Florida and the city of Orlando in previous years demonstrated their value during the June 12th attack. For example, an armored vehicle and the bomb detection robot used during response efforts were both purchased through these programs. Following the attack, I also immediately approved two requests from the Florida Division of Emergency Management to reallocate up to \$253 thousand in unspent HSGP funds for law enforcement overtime expenses.

In addition to DHS funding, the Department of Justice has made \$1 million available to help cover response costs. Also, thanks to

congressional action, DHS now has new funding mechanisms to support jurisdictions in their counterterrorism efforts. For this fiscal year, Congress appropriated \$49 million for the complex, Coordinated Terrorist Attack and Countering Violent Extremism Grant programs.

It is important to note that FEMA also has a comprehensive emergency management training curriculum for first responders that includes counterterrorism courses. In coordination with the National Counterterrorism Center and the FBI, we developed the Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop series. Participants work through an attack scenario to identify planning gaps and mitigation strategies. In 2014, Orlando hosted this workshop, with nearly 300 participants. And since 2011, FEMA has also trained more than 700,000 personnel, including many from Orlando, to respond to active shooter situations.

FEMA's honored to support Sheriff Demings, Chief Mina, and the Nation's first responders through these programs.

I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you today and I'm happy to respond to any questions the subcommittee may have. Thank you.

[Prepared statement of Mr. Kamioe follows:]

STATEMENT

OF

BRIAN KAMOIE
ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR GRANT PROGRAMS

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

BEFORE
THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION & PUBLIC ASSETS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

“Oversight of the Urban Area Security Initiative Grant Program”

Submitted
By

Federal Emergency Management Agency
500 C Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20472

July 15, 2016

Introduction

Chairman DeSantis, Chairman Mica, and members of the Subcommittees on Transportation and Public Assets and National Security: good morning. I am Brian Kamoie, Assistant Administrator for Grant Programs at the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). On behalf of Secretary Johnson and Administrator Fugate, thank you for the opportunity to discuss DHS and FEMA's overall efforts to assist states, tribes, territories, and localities in preparing for and responding to terrorist attacks and incidents of mass violence.

The recent terrorist attacks in Dallas and Orlando are reminders of how important it is for us, as a Nation, to prepare for, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate all hazards. This includes not only natural threats, such as flooding, earthquakes, tornadoes, and hurricanes, but also these types of organized terrorist attacks, lone shooters, and other man-made threats. Secretary Johnson and other DHS leadership are dedicated to determining how we can best prepare our communities for these types of events, and support them in the aftermath. Our thoughts and prayers are with the victims and their families, and our state and local law enforcement officers who risk their lives every day to protect our communities and our freedoms.

During any type of incident, local first responders, including law enforcement personnel, are first on scene and play a critical role in keeping our communities safe. This administration remains committed to ensuring all first responders have the resources they need to plan, equip, train, exercise, and operationalize, so they may prevent, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to a wide range of catastrophic incidents.

Today, I will outline some of FEMA's programs that support our state, local, tribal, and territorial partners in preparing for terrorist attacks and incidents of mass violence. I will also discuss how, through these programs, FEMA supported Florida and Orlando before and after the shooting in Orlando.

Homeland Security Preparedness Grant Programs

Since 2002, Congress, through the Department of Homeland Security, has awarded more than \$47 billion in preparedness grant funding to our state, local, tribal, territorial, and non-profit partners.

In Fiscal Year (FY) 2016, more than \$1.6 billion was awarded to our partners to support their preparedness efforts. More than \$1 billion of this is dedicated to the Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) that provides funding to states, territories, high risk urban areas, local and tribal governments, and non-profit institutions. The HSGP enables our partners to build, sustain, and deliver core capabilities that are essential to achieving the National Preparedness Goal (the Goal) of a secure and resilient Nation. The HSGP includes the State Homeland Security Program (SHSP), the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), and the Operation Stonegarden (OPSG) program. The SHSP and UASI provide the funding needed to address planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise needs, while the OPSG program focuses on securing our nation's borders. In addition to the HSGP, FEMA also provides funding to better secure key

transportation routes through transit security, port security, and intercity bus and passenger rail security grants. These grants help protect the public who rely on these key methods of transportation as well as facilitate commerce.

Per Section 2006 of the *Homeland Security Act of 2002*, as amended, FEMA is required to ensure that at least 25 percent of grant funding appropriated for the HSGP is used for law enforcement terrorism prevention activities. This includes a range of activities authorized per 6 U.S.C. §607, such as information sharing and analysis, target hardening, forensics and attribution activities, screening, search and detection efforts, as well as the interdiction and disruption of potential terrorist events. FEMA meets this requirement by requiring all SHSP and UASI recipients to ensure that at least 25 percent of the total funds awarded from those programs are dedicated to law enforcement terrorism prevention activities. Those award recipients report to FEMA twice per year on their expenditures, including their compliance with the law enforcement terrorism prevention requirement.

In FY 2016, the SHSP provides \$402 million to support building and sustaining preparedness capabilities. In FY 2015 and FY2016, Florida received more than \$22 million in SHSP funds. Florida also received more than \$1.3 million through the OPSG program to enhance cooperation and coordination among state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies in a joint mission to secure the Nation's borders.

In FY 2016, UASI grants were allocated to the 29 U.S. metropolitan areas identified as high-threat, high-density urban areas. As mandated by the Homeland Security Act and to ensure limited UASI funds are allocated to the cities with the highest risk, each year FEMA conducts a risk assessment of the 100 most populous Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA). The annual assessment is based on relative threat, vulnerability, and consequence factors from acts of terrorism faced by each MSA. Threat scores are derived from intelligence data compiled by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Vulnerability scores take into consideration information regarding targeted infrastructure that terrorists are deemed more likely to attack, as well as border crossings (i.e., air, land, and sea). Finally, consequence scores factor in an MSA's population, economic, national infrastructure, and national security indices. The results of the risk assessment, including the scores and relative ranking, inform the Secretary's decisions regarding eligible urban areas and funding allocations. The risk assessments are recalculated every year using the updated data.

Orlando received \$44,502,824 in total UASI funding from FYs 2003-2012. In FY 2013, Congress, for the first time, directed DHS to limit the number of jurisdictions funded under the UASI program to focus funding in the highest-risk urban areas, and limited the number of eligible urban areas to 25. Orlando had a relative risk rank of #30 of 100 in FY 2013 and, therefore, did not receive dedicated UASI funding. In FY 2014, Congress lifted the restriction on the total number of urban areas that DHS could fund under the UASI program and allowed the Secretary of Homeland Security full discretion on determining the number of funded urban areas. In FY 2014, Secretary Johnson funded 39 urban areas, including Orlando (ranked #33) which received \$1 million in UASI funding.

For FYs 2015 and 2016, in the annual Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Acts, Congress again directed DHS to restrict funding to “urban areas representing up to 85 percent of such risk” because “most of the cumulative national terrorism risk to urban areas is focused on a relatively small number of cities.” Secretary Johnson followed that Congressional direction and designated 28 urban areas as eligible for UASI funding in FY 2015 and 29 in FY 2016. Orlando fell outside the funded range in both of those years, ranking #32 in FY 2015 and #34 this fiscal year.

Previously awarded HSGP funds allocated to both the State of Florida and the City of Orlando have been used to increase preparedness, coordination, and response during the June 12, 2016 terrorist attack at the Pulse nightclub. For example, an armored personnel carrier vehicle referred to as a “Bearcat” and the bomb-detection robot used during the response efforts were purchased with both UASI and SHSP funds. Following the attack, FEMA also immediately approved two requests from the Florida Division of Emergency Management, the State Administrative Agency (SAA) for homeland security grant funds, to reallocate up to \$253,000 in unspent HSGP funds for the incurred and anticipated law enforcement operational overtime expenses for the Orange County Sheriff’s Office. The approval allows officials to use up to \$178,000 of these unspent FY 2014 UASI funds and \$75,000 of these unspent FY 2014 SHSP funds for these expenses. In addition to DHS and FEMA funding, the Department of Justice made \$1 million available to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement on Orlando’s behalf to help cover overtime costs for state and local law enforcement.

Complex Coordinated Terrorist Attack and Countering Violent Extremism Grants

In FY 2016, Congress appropriated \$39 million to prepare for, prevent, and respond to complex, coordinated terrorist attacks (CCTA). The CCTA funds will enhance resilience and build capacity for addressing CCTAs across the Nation. The program provides funding to local, state, tribal, and territorial jurisdictions of various types, sizes, and capabilities to improve their ability to prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from CCTAs. Funding will be available for: enhancing plans; developing and implementing training; conducting exercises; enhancing information sharing and other prevention efforts; and producing lessons learned, best practices, and other materials that can be shared with jurisdictions across the country to support their efforts. FEMA will issue a notice of funding opportunity for this program before the end of FY 2016.

Section 543 of the 2016 Homeland Security Appropriations Act also provided \$10 million for a Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) initiative to help states, tribes, and local communities prepare for, prevent, and respond to emergent threats from violent extremism. Congress directed that these funds be provided on a competitive basis to state, local, and tribal governments, non-profit organizations, or intuitions of higher education. Funding will be available for activities including, but not limited to: planning, developing, implementing, or expanding educational outreach, community engagement, social service programs, training, and exercises.

On July 6, 2016, the Secretary of Homeland Security issued a notice of funding opportunity announcing the launch of the CVE Grant Program. Eligible parties will have 60 days, until September 6, 2016, to prepare and submit applications for federal grant funding to support local

CVE efforts. This program is designed to encourage and scale successful community-led initiatives across the country and enhance the Nation's resilience against threats posed by violent extremism.

Training First Responders

FEMA's National Training and Education System (NTES) is designed to foster an integrated and effective approach to building the knowledge and skills of homeland security professionals. This world-class system includes the development and delivery of training courses to first responders on a wide variety of emergency response topics. In-person training is offered throughout the country, including at FEMA's Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) in Anniston, Alabama, where more than 45,000 responders are trained per year in disciplines such as emergency management, emergency medical services, fire service, hazardous materials, law enforcement, public safety communications, and public works. FEMA also manages the Emergency Management Institute (EMI) and U.S. National Fire Academy, both housed at the National Emergency Training Center (NETC) in Emmitsburg, Maryland.

In addition to general emergency management training courses, FEMA offers training specifically designed to address terrorism incidents. For example, since 2011 EMI trained more than 700,000 participants, including students from Orlando, to respond to active shooter situations.

In coordination with the National Counter Terrorism Center and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, FEMA developed and manages two training programs designed to assist communities in preparing for the kinds of complex terrorist attacks we have recently witnessed. The Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop Series (JCTAWS) is geared to UASI cities, while the Integrated Emergency Management Course was developed for metropolitan areas that may have fewer resources and less experience with counterterrorism operations. So far, more than 6,200 responders across 26 cities have participated in JCTAWS, with 11 additional deliveries scheduled through FY 2017. In September 2014, Orlando hosted a JCTAWS with nearly 300 federal, state, local, and private-sector participants.

These programs are designed to be community-specific training initiatives to improve the ability of local jurisdictions to prepare for, protect against, and respond to complex coordinated attacks. Through briefings, case studies, facilitated discussions, and planning workshops, participants work through attack scenarios to identify gaps in their current plans as well as mitigation strategies.

Conclusion

It is the local first responders – law enforcement, fire, EMS – who are first on the scene and thus are our most important partners in preparing for, mitigating, and responding to attacks such as what took place in Orlando and Dallas. FEMA is honored to support these and all first responders by administering and utilizing the resources Congress provides to implement these programs as an integral part of the Nation's preparedness. FEMA will continue to work with Orlando, the State of Florida, Dallas, the State of Texas, and our partners to help organize, train,

equip, and exercise our first responders, so they are prepared to respond to any future incident. I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss these important programs, and I am happy to respond to any questions the subcommittee may have at this time or moving forward. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. And we will get to questions after we've heard from the other witnesses.

Let me now recognize and welcome again Sheriff Demings, the Orange County sheriff. You're recognized.

STATEMENT OF SHERIFF JERRY DEMINGS

Sheriff DEMINGS. Good morning, Chairman Mica and Chairman DeSantis.

Mr. MICA. I'm not sure if your mic's on.

Sheriff DEMINGS. Good morning, Chairman Mica and Chairman DeSantis and members of the committee. It is indeed an honor and a privilege for me to provide testimony today.

Let me begin by saying that I wish we didn't have to provide testimony, because there is no risk of a terror attack in Orlando, but sadly we know that that is no longer the case.

I will be addressing the valuable projects funded in previous years by the Urban Area Security Initiative, or UASI grant program, our DHS and FEMA efforts to reassess the Orlando, Kissimmee, Sanford, Florida, MSA, and the need to strengthen and secure the Central Florida region from another terror attack like the Pulse nightclub incident.

The Central Florida region has been fortunate to receive approximately \$45.5 million in UASI funding since 2004. The Orange County Sheriff's Office is the agency which has managed those funds. The funding received prior to 2013 was critical to our region's ability to prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from not only terrorism, but a broad range of other threats and hazards.

We are only as good at preventing a terror attack as the quality of information that we receive about that attack. One of the assets that we have in our region is the Central Florida Intelligence Exchange Fusion Center. The fusion center is a center that operates in Central Florida in Orlando. It is located just outside of the airport. It serves as a central repository of databases that are currently being used by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies.

In addition to its counterterrorism focus, CFIIX serves as an all hazards fusion center, assisting agencies in the mitigation and assistance needed to recover from hazards such as hurricanes and other natural disasters. CFIIX assists with investigations of crimes that possibly contain a nexus to terrorist activity or other Homeland Security issues.

Due to a lack of funding, some critical needs of CFIIX have been lost. We have reduced the number of analysts, which could have worked to provide intelligence information that could prevent a terror attack.

Examples of CFIIX success stories include an incident in which CFIIX assisted the U.S. Marshals in locating Federal fugitives. In another instance, CFIIX assisted the United States Secret Service and the United States Coast Guard in locating a disgruntled citizen, who made concerning statements about the President prior to the launch of a Space Shuttle Endeavor mission, and numerous other instances in which they provided information with a nexus to national security.

Through the National Infrastructure Protection Program, we received UASI funding for a video camera surveillance project in the tourist quarter, downtown Orlando, and in areas near the University of Central Florida. Chief Mina will talk more about that.

Due to a loss of funding, we have not been able to expand the camera project into areas around our top tourist destinations.

On June 12th, we experienced the benefits of more than a dozen or so UASI-funded training exercises of the past years. I believe the agencies responding to the Pulse incident flawlessly initiated an active shooter response because of training paid for through historical UASI funding. You have a list of the training exercises in your material.

We train to respond as a region to a terror attack or other disaster. In fact, on June 12, approximately 150 of my deputies responded, with the Orlando Police Department, to the Pulse incident.

Because of the infrastructure connections in our region, it is natural to have a regional capability and vulnerability assessment. Presently, FEMA uses the Office of Management and Budget's geographical boundaries defined in the Federal Register when calculating the risk score. We believe that the boundaries should be expanded to include the Brevard County area to the east and Volusia County Metropolitan Statistical Area to the north.

In September of 2015, we began the process of lobbying the Federal Government to combine the metropolitan Orlando MSA with Brevard and Volusia. This was broadly supported by our Members of Congress from Central Florida as well as other State and local elected officials, and numerous letters were written to the FEMA assistant administrator of grant programs, the OMB statistician, and the OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. You have a list and copies of the letters in your material.

I really don't have time this morning to get into the details of the methodology used in assigning risk, but we suggest that DHS include domestic and international visitors in the equation, and not just permanent resident population in the scoring. One credible attack in Central Florida to a theme park would be disastrous for our economy.

With the recent attacks in Orlando, the incidents in Dallas and San Bernardino, there is a need in this country to have an overall perhaps increase in UASI funding, or at the very least, a redistribution of UASI funding across the Nation. That could increase the top MSAs with the most risk from the current 85 receiving funding to perhaps 90 percent of the MSAs on the high risk list of the top 100.

Congressman Mica has been a staunch supporter of many of these efforts, and we appreciate the fact that he invited us to participate today.

In 2016, the Orlando MSA was 34th on the list, when only 29 metropolitan statistical areas were funded.

In closing, thank you for allowing me to speak. And I ask the committee to analyze the current MSA methodology formula and the data used in the formula to reflect current threats and vulnerabilities in Central Florida. We have now been probed, which makes us more of a target. Thank you very much.

[Prepared statement of Mr. Demings follows:]

**Statement of Jerry L. Demings
Sheriff of Orange County, Florida
Orange County Sheriff's Office**

Before the
**U.S. House of Representatives
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform**

Concerning
“Oversight of the Urban Area Security Initiative”

**Friday, July 15, 2016
2154 Rayburn House Office Building**

JERRY L. DEMINGS**PERSONAL BIOGRAPHY**

Sheriff Jerry L. Demings is a native of Orlando and was born to Freddie and Josephine Demings. He is the youngest of five children and has a twin brother. He attended Orange County, Florida public schools and is a graduate of Jones High School, where he graduated with honors in 1977. He later received his Bachelor of Science degree in Finance from Florida State University in 1980 and his Master of Business Administration degree in 1989 from Orlando College, which is now Everest University. He graduated Magna Cum Laude and is listed in Who's Who Among College Students. He is also a 1998 graduate of the 194th session of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Academy and 2000 graduate of the 23rd session of the FBI's National Executive Institute. He was awarded a certificate of completion for the Senior Executives in State and Local Government program, July 2013, by the Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government. Jerry was awarded an honorary Doctorate of Humane Letters from City College in 2001, a second honorary Doctorate in Humane Letters from Everest University in 2002 and an honorary Doctorate of Laws from Florida Technical College in 2013.

Jerry is married to former Orlando Police Chief Valdez B. Demings who was appointed by Mayor Buddy Dyer in December 2007 as the first female Police Chief in the history of Orlando. She retired from the agency in June 2011 after nearly 28 years. Sheriff Demings was also appointed as Orlando's first black police chief in 1998, which makes him and his wife national history makers. They have three sons, two of whom are also twins. Their sons are graduates of Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University in Tallahassee, Florida.

On November 4, 2008, Jerry was elected the first African-American Sheriff and Constitutional Officer in the history of Orange County, Florida and was sworn in on January 6, 2009. He is the chief law enforcement executive in the county and manages a \$200 million dollar budget and approximately 2,500 employees. Jerry serves our nation as a member of the FEMA National Advisory Council and was appointed by the Chief Justice of Florida's Supreme Court to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Task Force through 2016. He became the first African American President of the Florida Sheriffs Association in July 2016 and is the President of the Major County Sheriffs Foundation.

During his tenure as Sheriff, crime has been reduced in Orange County and the agency has operated under budget each year. Through his leadership, the Orange County Sheriff's Office has been reaccredited by state and national accrediting organizations and the agency was honored with receiving Florida's very first "Excelsior Agency" certificate and one of the nation's first "Flagship" agency awards. In December 2010, the Sheriff's Office dedicated a new substation in east Orange County, opened a new aviation hanger in October 2010 and reopened a renovated substation in the Apopka area of northwest

Orange County in June 2010. In 2011 a new substation was also opened in the International Drive tourist corridor and the West Orange substation was renovated. In April 2016 a new substation was opened in Lake Buena Vista.

Prior to being sheriff, Chairman Richard Crotty appointed Jerry as the Director of Public Safety for Orange County in October 2002 and he served in that capacity until he resigned to run full-time for Sheriff in January 2008. He oversaw the Orange County Corrections Department, Orange County Fire Rescue Department, Public Safety Communications Division, Drug Free Community Office, Office of Criminal Justice Coordination and the Consumer Fraud Unit. He had combined budgetary oversight of over \$320 million and nearly 3200 employees. He was the first African-American to serve in that capacity.

Mayor Glenda Hood appointed him as Orlando Police Chief on December 30, 1998. He retired from the agency in November of 2002 after 21 years of service. He was credited with reducing crime four consecutive years, decentralizing patrol operations by opening two substations, instituting a take-home vehicle plan, placing computers in police cars, implementing problem oriented policing, reorganizing the agency into three operational bureaus with an emphasis on service and getting the agency reaccredited by the Florida Commission on Law Enforcement Accreditation.

Sheriff Demings is involved in numerous community service activities including the following: Saint Mark African Methodist Episcopal Church Steward; Member and former Basileus Chi Tau Chapter of Omega Psi Phi Fraternity; Life Member Alpha Phi Omega Fraternity, member Sigma Pi Phi Fraternity. He serves on the Board of Directors for Central Florida Crimeline, Inc., Central Florida Boy Scouts of America, Boys and Girls Club of Central Florida, Children's Safety Village and the West Orange Committee of 101. Jerry is known for his leadership in fundraising efforts for numerous programs that benefit children. He has helped raise millions of dollars for local non-profit organizations. He has been recognized by Orlando Magazine as one of the 50 most influential Central Floridians each year since 2009 and has been recognized by the Orlando Sentinel many years as one of the 25 most influential persons in the area. His leadership has been evident during crises such as the events of 9/11, the Florida hurricanes of 2004, the Casey Anthony trial of 2009/10 and the June 12, 2016 Orlando massacres.

He is also a member of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, National Sheriffs Association, Major County Sheriffs Association, Florida Sheriffs Association, Florida Police Chiefs Association, National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, FBI National Academy Associates and various other professional affiliations.

Jerry L. Demings

Orange County Sheriff (Florida)

Oversight of the Urban Area Security Initiative Grant Program

July 15, 2016 – Washington, DC

Chairman Mica, Chairman DeSantis, and Members of the Committee:

It is indeed an honor and a privilege for me to provide testimony to the Subcommittees on Transportation and Public Assets and National Security of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. I will be addressing the valuable projects funded in previous years by the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program, our DHS and FEMA efforts to reassess the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL MSA, and the need to continue funding to sustain our projects to strengthen and secure the Central Florida region to prevent another Orlando Pulse incident.

The Central Florida region has been fortunate to receive approximately \$45,502,824 in UASI funding from DHS since 2004. However, we have not received funding since 2013 (only \$950,000 in 2014 discretionary funds). The funding received prior to 2013 was critical to enhance our region's ability to prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from not only terrorism, but a broad range of other threats and hazards affecting our entire region. I will briefly discuss a few of these regional projects that have enhanced our region's capabilities.

Central Florida Intelligence Exchange (CFIX) Fusion Center Project:

One of the most accomplished and notable regional partnership projects in Central Florida that was funded by UASI is our Central Florida Intelligence Exchange (CFIX) Fusion Center. CFIX is modeled after a number of highly successful counter terrorism and intelligence fusion centers throughout the country. It is centrally located in the state as well as in Region 5 of the state's Regional Domestic Security Task Force. It serves as a central repository for a wide array of databases that are currently being used by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) and other law enforcement agencies throughout the state, as well as the many databases available via federal and other joint agreements. CFIX is a unique entity that identifies with Central Florida's law enforcement needs. It provides "one stop shopping" for information and intelligence stored in a multitude of automated files maintained in open source, commercial vendor and confidential law enforcement databases. In addition, CFIX acts as a clearinghouse designed to accurately analyze and assess the voluminous amount of information and intelligence received from open sources, law enforcement and other agencies throughout the state. In this capacity, CFIX serves as an "All Hazards" fusion center, assisting agencies in the mitigation and assistance needed to recover from hazards, such as hurricanes, hazmat situations, tornadoes and other natural disasters. CFIX assists with investigations of crimes that possibly contain a nexus to terrorist activity or other homeland security issues and also provides the added benefit of identifying parallel investigations, reducing duplication of effort and enhancing officer safety.

Due to the lack of funding, some critical needs have been lost at CFIX, i.e., key analysts' positions (cyber security and emergency management), risk management software, and valuable training for the analysts and staff.

I would like to share with you a couple success stories resulting from CFIX.

- CFIIX received several requests for information from the US Marshals Service (USMS) to attempt to determine the location of several different wanted federal fugitives with criminal warrants. One of the subjects was also a wanted immigration violator who had absconded from federal judicial proceedings and was believed to be residing in the Central Florida region. The USMS contacted CFIIX after previously exhausting all investigative leads to see if CFIIX could provide any additional leads or information that would lead to the capture of the wanted subjects. CFIIX was able to use available resources and databases to determine the location and fraudulent identities used by the subjects along with the locations where the subjects were residing via social media intelligence and facial recognition. This information allowed the USMS to locate the wanted subjects locally and throughout the southern United States.
- CFIIX received a request for information from the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) for notification of any threats pertaining to the launch of space shuttle Endeavor. The State Fire Marshal's Office (FL) received a letter and forwarded a copy to CFIIX regarding a disgruntled citizen who was recently denied a permit to host an event of "burning the Quran for free speech" due to burning restrictions and drought conditions in that area. In the letter, the disgruntled citizen explained how President Obama would be damaged by his action and the USSS was getting in the way. He also mentioned other implications as well. CFIIX provided a copy of this letter to the USSS and USCG for situational awareness. The USSS contacted CFIIX and advised they were familiar with the author of the letter; however, they were not aware of his whereabouts or recent implications towards them or the President.

National Infrastructure Protection Program (NIPP) Project:

Another UASI project build out in the funding years was the National Infrastructure Protection Program-Regional Camera Video Surveillance project. The camera project includes the International Drive District, downtown Orlando, and the second largest university in the United States, the University of Central Florida.

Due to the loss of funding, the project has not been able extend past those areas to include some of the top tourist visited areas in Central Florida and the other five counties in our Orlando/Orange UASI region. The cameras have been instrumental in the capture of two homicide suspects and one attempted murder suspect, and assisted in safely monitoring numerous persons of interest in federal investigations. They have also allowed us to safely monitor protest groups around critical infrastructures without the need of sending first responders into the area of the protest.

Orlando/Orange UASI Training Exercises:

Over the years our region has participated in multi-discipline and agency table top, functional and full-scale exercises (FSE) funded by the Orlando/Orange UASI including Brevard and Volusia counties. These exercises have assisted in identifying gaps and preparing for mass casualty, catastrophic events.

- October 29, 2008 UASI Evacuation Plan Tabletop Exercise
- June 2010 UASI Brevard County Full-Scale Exercise

- July 2010 UASI Osceola County Full-Scale Exercise
- July 2010 UASI Volusia County Full-Scale Exercise
- September 15, 2011 UASI PRND Functional Exercise
- December 15, 2011 UASI Tabletop Exercise
- February 1, 2012 UASI NBA Functional Exercise
- September 25, 2012 UASI Community Medical Surge Tabletop Exercise
- March 14, 2013 Operation Crash & Surge Full Scale Medical Exercise
- June 12, 2014 HazMat & USAR Plume of Doom Table Top Exercise
- September 24, 2014 Urban Search and Rescue ADSAR Mobex Exercise
- October 27, 2014 HazMat and USAR Operation Vanishing Mosquito FSE

The Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) relative risk score has decreased drastically over the years and prevented us from receiving an allocation of UASI funds. Since 2012, we have appealed (listed below) every MSA relative risk score and asked DHS/FEMA for data used in the MSA Risk Methodology Formula. Each year, we have stated our Orlando/Orange UASI Strategy includes Brevard (Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL MSA) and Volusia (Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL MSA) counties and funded various projects totaling \$3.5 million. Because we have mutual agreements with those two counties and those two counties' relative risk score is 88 and 99, we feel it is important and critical to include them in building our strength in Central Florida. Brevard and Volusia law enforcement agencies responded and assisted with the recent Orlando Pulse incident. The FEMA response to each appeal has been the same answer; FEMA uses the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) geographical boundaries defined in the Federal Register when calculating the formula.

In September 2015, we began the process of asking the regional partners for assistance in combining Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL MSA and Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL MSA into the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL MSA. I, along with other elected officials from our region, as well as city and county officials, sent numerous letters to FEMA Assistant Administrator of Grant Programs, Brian Kamoe, OMB Chief Statistician, Katherine K. Wallman, and OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Mabel Echols, in support of combining the above MSAs (see attached). Members of my staff have presented our initiative across the region at various council meetings and visited the offices of local Congressmen for their support. Recently, in May of 2016, my staff met with DHS/FEMA, Florida Congressmen, and Members of the Appropriations Committee in Washington, DC to request their support. Here is our timeline of efforts:

- August 21, 2013
 - Meeting and tour of CFIIX with Elected Officials/Legislators to discuss the CFIIX mission and the CFIIX/Orlando/Orange UASI funding issues.
- October 28, 2014
 - Meeting with DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis Francis Taylor at CFIIX to discuss the CFIIX/Orlando/Orange UASI funding issues.
- June 28, 2015
 - Meeting with DHS Assistant Secretary Heather Fong to discuss the CFIIX/Orlando/Orange UASI funding issues and provided documentation.

- September 14, 2015
 - Space Coast League of Cities Presentation
 - President signed Resolution #04-2015
- September 16, 2015
 - East Central Florida Regional Planning Council (ECFRPC) Presentation. Senator Nelson's Regional Director, Helen Miller was in attendance.
 - ECFRPC Chair signed Resolution #06-2015
 - MSA letter of support templates were sent to Fire and Emergency Management disciplines.
- September 17, 2015
 - Tri-County League of Cities Presentation
 - President signed Resolution #015-02 on October 5, 2015
- September 22, 2015
 - Sheriff Demings sent out MSA letter of support templates to Sheriffs and Chiefs.
- October 5, 2015
 - Presented to UASI Executive Board and UAWG the UASI initiative of combining Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL MSA and Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL MSA with Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL MSA.
- October 13, 2015
 - Meeting with Congressman Grayson's Director of Operations, Jose Rodriguez.
 - Meeting with Congresswoman Brown's Area Director, Ronita Sanders.
- October 14, 2015
 - Meeting with Congressman DeSantis' District Representative, Naomi D'Antonio.
- October 22, 2015
 - Meeting with Congressman Webster's Constituent Services Representative, Samuel Green.
- October 30, 2015
 - Meeting with Volusia County Chiefs Association. They signed the MSA letters of support on 10/8/15.
 - Meeting with Congressman Mica's District Aide, Thomas Larsen.
- November 9, 2015
 - Congressman Mica was in town and met with him to discuss our initiative.
- November 10, 2015
 - Fedex the MSA letters of support to:
 - Brian E. Kamoie, FEMA Assistant Administrator for Grant Programs
 - Mabel Echols, OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (Mr. Kamoie suggested we send the letters to her too)
 - Katherine K. Wallman, OMB Chief Statistician
- November 19, 2015
 - Sheriff Demings met with Helen Miller from Senator Nelson's office.
- January 15, 2016
 - MSA letter to appeal 2016 MSA Relative Risk Score was submitted to DHS.
- January 20, 2016
 - Emails were sent out to all the individuals we met at the Congressmen and Congresswoman's offices informing them of our drop in ranking.

- January 27, 2016
 - Congressman Mica and Congressman Webster sent a MSA appeal letter to Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson.
- January 29, 2016
 - Congressman Grayson sent a MSA appeal letter to Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson.
- May 9, 2016
 - OCSO, OPD, and Legislative Director with Orange County Mayor Jacob's office met with Andrew Giacini, legislative aide to Congressman Mica about our initiative and their research on the OMB MSA.
 - OCSO, OPD, and Legislative Director with Orange County Mayor Jacob's office met with Professional Staff Members to the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security.
- May 10, 2016
 - OCSO, OPD, and Legislative Director with Orange County Mayor Jacob's office met with U.S. Department of Homeland Security and FEMA on our initiative.
 - OCSO, OPD, and Legislative Director with Orange County Mayor Jacob's office met with Congressman Mica on our initiative.
- May 11, 2016
 - OCSO, OPD, and Legislative Director with Orange County Mayor Jacob's office met with Congressman DeSantis and Congressman Ross on our initiative.
 - OCSO, OPD, and Legislative Director with Orange County Mayor Jacob's office met with Congressman Graves, Congressman Duncan, Congressman Harris, Congressman Clawson, and Congressman Carter on our initiative.
 - Congressman Graves (GA) is the Chairman of Financial Services & General Government Appropriations Subcommittee.
 - Congressman Duncan (SC) is a Member of Homeland Security Committee.
 - Congressman Harris (MD) is a Member of Homeland Security Committee.
 - Congressman Clawson (FL)
 - Congressman Carter (TX) is a Chairman of Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee.

In combination with the MSA merging initiative, the staff also spoke on suggested recommendations to the MSA Risk Methodology Formula:

- Revise the Population Index (30% of overall assessment) to better address visitors to the region.
 - Central Florida MSA ranks #1 in domestic daily visitors. However, the overall Population Index rank for FY 2016 is 30th.
 - Suggested Revision: Incorporate and weigh international visitors into the equation.
- Link Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to Daily Visitors
 - Economic Impact of GDP accounts for 13% of an area's "relative risk."

- Central Florida is unique in that visitors to the region are also one of its “commodities of trade.” One credible attack in Central Florida would eliminate both the population and GDP (including visitors). The assessment should better address this link.
- **Suggested Revision:** Revise the “relative risk” scoring to account for this unique-to-Florida tie between GDP and visitors.
- Account for Bordering MSAs with International Waters
 - Bordering an international water body positively weights the “relative risk” score. The Central Florida MSA does not border international waters. However, it does border three MSAs that border international waters (Tampa Bay, Volusia and Brevard). The Central Florida UASI provides funding to both Brevard and Volusia to secure borders, despite neither county belonging to the Central Florida MSA and will never receive funding due to their low relative risk scores. Accordingly, it would make sense that Central Florida’s proximity to international water MSAs should be considered in assessing its “relative risk.”
 - **Suggested Revision:** Revise the scoring to account for MSAs that border three or more MSAs that border international waters.
- Increase funding to support the top high threat risk MSAs
 - Congressman Mica has expressed his support to increase funding from the current nationwide risk level of 85% to 90%, which includes the Central Florida MSA.

In closing, thank you for allowing me to speak on behalf of the Orlando/Orange UASI and I ask the committee to analyze the current MSA Risk Methodology Formula and the data used in the formula to reflect the current threats and vulnerabilities in the Central Florida region. Also, please take into consideration the above suggested revisions to provide the resources to prepare, prevent, respond, and recover from catastrophic events due to the uniqueness of the Central Florida community, the number one tourist destination in the nation.

MSA Appeals

- 2016 Appeal submitted and denied
- 2014 Appeal submitted and denied
- 2013 Appeal submitted and denied
- 2012 Appeal submitted and denied

MSA Letters of Support (attached)

- June 29, 2016 from Congressman John L. Mica
- June 17, 2016 from Congressman John L. Mica
- June 15, 2016 from Senator Marco Rubio and Senator Bill Nelson
- January 29, 2016 from Congressman Alan Grayson
- January 27, 2016 from Congressman John L. Mica and Congressman Daniel Webster
- November 4, 2015 to Brian Kamoie, Katherine Wallman and Mabel Echols
- March 27, 2014 from Congressman Daniel Webster
- February 12, 2014 from Congressman Bill Posey, Congressman Alan Grayson, Congresswoman Corrine Brown, Congressman John L. Mica, Congressman Daniel Webster

JOHN L. MICA
7TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-0907

June 29, 2016

Sheriff Jerry Demings
Sheriff
Orange County Sheriff's Office
P.O. Box 1440
Orlando, FL 32802

RECEIVED
JUL 06 2016
Office of the Sheriff

Dear Jerry:

I wanted to take this opportunity to write to you in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on our community. I know you join me in being most grateful to our first responders and community leaders who have helped us in one of the most significant tragedies to face our community. We continue to keep the victims and families involved in this attack in our prayers.

Since the attack, I have called for and begun an investigation of some of the failures by the federal government in allowing this terrorist act to occur.

For some time, I have worked to address the danger terrorism poses to our community. When my Congressional District changed several years ago, I immediately requested meetings with our first responders and law enforcement leaders to fully understand the challenges and security threats Central Florida faces. Last year, Orange County Sheriff Jerry Demings, Orlando Police Chief John Mina and other law enforcement officials informed me about the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) flawed Community Terrorism Risk Assessment for Central Florida. They expressed their concern to me that DHS, on the basis of this assessment, had reduced critical federal funds available to them under the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) program before completely stripping the Central Florida Region of eligibility in 2015.

DHS is responsible for evaluating the risk of terrorism attacks for communities across America. In 2015, DHS incorrectly assessed the Orlando Central Florida Metro Statistical Area as a community that was considered a low risk for a possible terrorist attack. Since 2014, this incorrect and dramatically flawed assessment by DHS has denied federal funding through the UASI program, keeping federal grants from the Orlando area that could have been used to address possible terrorist threats.

Despite my appeals and multiple requests by the Orlando Police Department and the Orange County Sheriff's Office to DHS to fix this flawed terrorist threat assessment, DHS refused to reconsider. Despite our pleas and concerns about soft targets, Central Florida was denied federal funding, which was instead directed to cities like Los Angeles, which received \$68 million of the program's \$600 million annual federal appropriation for 2016, and New York City, which received \$178 million.

JOHN L. MICA
7TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

www.Mica.house.gov
www.facebook.com/JohnMica

COMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION
AND PUBLIC ASSETS
CHAIRMAN
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0907

June 17, 2016

RECEIVED

JUN 21 2016

Office of the Sheriff

Jerry Demings
Orange County Sheriff
P.O. Box 1440
Orlando, FL 32802

Dear Sheriff Demings,

This past week, Orlando was hit with a tremendous tragedy, and we continue to mourn the loss of life in the recent terrorist attack. At the same time, I want to let you know I am working to make sure everything is done to ensure our community's safety in the future.

When my Congressional District changed several years ago, I immediately requested meetings with our first responders and law enforcement leaders to fully understand the challenges and security threats Central Florida faces. For some time I have worked to address the danger terrorism poses to our community. Last year, Orange County Sheriff Jerry Demings, Orlando Police Chief John Mina and other law enforcement officials informed me about the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) flawed community terrorism Risk Assessment for Central Florida. They expressed their concern to me that DHS had reduced critical federal funds and completely stripped the Central Florida Region's eligibility and funds in 2015.

DHS is responsible for evaluating the risk of terrorism attacks for communities across America. In 2015, DHS refused to classify the Orlando Central Florida Metro Statistical Area as a community that was at risk of a possible terrorist attack. Since 2014, this incorrect and dramatically flawed assessment by DHS has denied federal funding through the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) program, keeping federal grants from the Orlando area that could have been used to address possible terrorist threats.

Despite my appeals and multiple requests over the past years by the Orlando Police Department and the Orange County Sheriff's Office to DHS to reverse this flawed terrorist threat assessment, DHS refused to reconsider. Despite our pleas and concerns about soft targets, Central Florida was denied federal funding which was instead directed to cities like Los Angeles, which received \$68 million, and New York City, which received \$1.78 million, of the program's \$600 million annual federal appropriation for 2016.

In my January 27, 2016 appeal letter to DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, I concluded by saying, "[I]f Central Florida became a target, it would be a national disaster." The failure of DHS to accurately determine the risk of terrorist threats to Orlando represents one of the most egregious and inaccurate federal security miscalculations since 9/11.

As a member of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee and senior Member of the National Security Subcommittee, I have requested an investigation and a full review of this matter and the gross national security assessment failure.

In my January 27, 2016 appeal letter to DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson, I concluded by saying, “[I]f Central Florida became a target, it would be a national disaster.” The failure of DHS to accurately determine the risk of terrorist threats to Orlando represents one of the most egregious federal security miscalculations since 9/11.

As a member of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee and senior member of the National Security Subcommittee, I have requested and we have begun a full review of this matter. These incorrect assessments and failures of federal agencies are unacceptable. I will work to hold those responsible accountable and ensure that these critical mistakes are corrected.

A congressional hearing on this matter will be conducted in the near future to review the status of Orlando’s Threat Risk Assessment. Furthermore, I am confident that Congress will accept proposals that I have offered to ensure that Florida is not short-changed in receiving federal assistance to address the potential threats by terrorists. We are also working to reverse the initial denial disaster assistance, which was recently released by the Administration.

While we continue to mourn the lives of those lost in the attack, I believe it is important that their loss be properly remembered by our community.

I do not believe anyone will ever be able to pass by the site of this attack and not remember the wonderful lives of those who were lost on that morning. Earlier this week, I suggested to Orlando Mayor Buddy Dyer and the other City Commissioners that the city consider acquiring the Pulse and create a memorial park on that property. This could be an appropriate memorial to those lost in the Orlando terrorist attack. However, I will work with local officials and support any memorial they deem fitting and appropriate.

As we continue to recover and keep Central Florida and Orlando strong and united, I look forward to working with you and other community leaders as we address these serious challenges.

Sincerely,



John L. Mica
Member of Congress

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

June 15, 2016

The Honorable Jeh C. Johnson
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
301 7th Street SW
Washington, D.C. 20528

Dear Secretary Johnson:

We write you today as our state grieves the loss of 49 victims in a horrendous, premeditated and coordinated terrorist attack in the heart of Orlando. Many questions still remain about this specific tragedy and investigations are ongoing. As federal, state and local agencies analyze source data, determine motivation and the effectiveness of response to better understand the chain of events that led to the carnage on June 12, we also must look forward and do what we can to prevent future attacks.

Specifically, as Florida's Senators, we share concerns that federal security and anti-terrorism resources have not adequately focused on Central Florida. Orlando, and its surrounding communities, welcome more daily visitors than any other area in the United States, over 66 million annually. Its theme parks are known around the world and many of them are synonymous with the American way of life. At a time when terrorists have increasingly shifted their strategy to "soft targets" susceptible to mass casualty events, Federal, state and local authorities must maintain a heightened level of vigilance and dedicate adequate resources to protect the people of the Orlando area and the many visitors they so graciously welcome.

We are also aware that, even before the recent tragedy, the Central Florida area has been affected by multiple terrorist plots. Both the Boston bombing terrorists and the 9/11 perpetrators had ties to Central Florida. The area has also received multiple bomb threats to a variety of locations.

One federal program, the Urban Area Security Initiative, provides important support to help certain high-threat urban areas to prevent, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks. For the last several years, Orlando has not qualified for funding under this initiative, despite its obvious global-profile and vulnerability. In light of the recent tragedy, previous history with terrorist investigations, and emerging terrorist threats, we respectfully suggest you reevaluate the Relative Risk Score and Threat Level your Department applies to the Orlando area under this program with heavily weighted consideration of the Joint Terrorism Task Force input.

Thank you for your consideration,



Senator Marco Rubio



Senator Bill Nelson

These incorrect assessments and failures of federal agencies are unacceptable. I will work to hold those responsible accountable and ensure that these critical mistakes are corrected. Please know that I welcome your counsel on this vital matter.

Most respectfully,



John L. Mica
Member of Congress

ALAN GRAYSON
8TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE,
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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0909

303 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-9889

ORLANDO DISTRICT OFFICE
5842 SOUTH SEMORAY BOULEVARD
ORLANDO, FL 32822
(407) 618-9889

KISSIMMEE DISTRICT OFFICE
101 CHURCH STREET
SUITE 550
KISSIMMEE, FL 34741
(407) 618-4983
grayson.house.gov

January 29, 2016

The Honorable Jeh Johnson
Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
3801 Nebraska Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Secretary Johnson:

I respectfully request that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reexamine and correct the FY 2016 risk profile for the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).

The draft profile issued on January 4, 2016 assigned the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA a relative risk score of 34. This score is lower than the FY 2014 and FY 2015 ranking (32), FY 2013 ranking (30), and markedly below the FY 2012 ranking (27).

I fail to see how this reduced ranking can be justified when every risk component in the formula – Threat (30%) – Vulnerability (20%) – Consequence (50%) – shows either the same, or greater, risk to the region. I therefore request that your risk profile review assign a relative risk score that more accurately reflects the heightened security concerns of the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA.

Threat Component

In recent years, there have been numerous threats to the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA. In 2013, the University of Central Florida averted a potential mass shooting due to the quick response of local law enforcement agencies. In 2009, Jason Rodriguez committed a mass shooting of an office building in downtown Orlando, resulting in the closure of Interstate 4 and the lockdown of nearby schools and businesses. Just last month, due to the fear of increased terrorism and gun violence, Walt Disney World, Universal Studios Florida, and SeaWorld Orlando all began using metal detectors at their theme parks.

It is worth noting that some of the most significant threats to the U.S. homeland had ties to the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA. The 2013 Boston Marathon bombing terrorists had direct

ties to a person of interest, Ibragim Todashev, a Chechen-born individual who was living in Orlando when he was shot and killed after attacking an FBI agent and two Massachusetts State Troopers in his apartment on May 22, 2013. The majority of the 9/11 hijackers passed through Central Florida and Orlando International Airport, with several of the hijackers trained at the nearby Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Daytona Beach. In August 2001, a potential “20th hijacker” was prevented from entering the U.S. by an alert border agent at Orlando International Airport.

These examples, together with the continuous work at Orlando International Airport to avert both domestic and international attacks, demands an enhanced FY 2016 risk profile for the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA.

Vulnerability Component

The ‘Vulnerability Component’ of the relative risk formula is comprised of two indices, the ‘Targeted Infrastructure Index’ and the ‘Border Index’.

Targeted Infrastructure Index

The ‘Targeted Infrastructure Index’ is defined as:

A subset of the DHS Office of Cyber & Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA) Level 1/Level 2 count that represents assets/systems in the UASI within sectors that DHS/I&A deems terrorists are more likely to attack, including: aviation; mass transit and commuter rail; oil and natural gas facilities (refineries, storage facilities, tankers, and pipelines); and large public facilities and venues (hotels, resorts, stadiums and arenas, and large office buildings).

It is clear that every category identified above favors a higher FY 2016 risk profile ranking for the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA. Indeed, a review of the area’s relevant “assets/systems” highlights the following potential targets:

Large Public Facilities and Venues

Walt Disney World: a 25,000 acre complex with four theme parks, 24 themed resorts, two water parks, and several additional venues; the complex is the most visited attraction in the world, with approximately 53 million visitors per year

Universal Studios Florida: the eighth- most visited theme park in the U.S., with nearly 8.2 million visitors per year

Sea World Orlando: the tenth- most visited theme park in the U.S., with 4.6 million visitors per year

Orange County Convention Center: the second largest convention center in the U.S.; hosts more than one million attendees per year

University of Central Florida: the second largest university in the nation, with an enrollment of over 63,000 students

Central Florida Research Park: the fourth largest research park in the nation by number of companies, and the seventh largest in the nation by number of employees

Citrus Bowl: frequently fills to capacity (60,000 seats) during college football games and concerts

Aviation

Orlando International Airport (MCO): the 13th busiest airport in the U.S., 14th largest airport in the U.S., and 29th busiest airport in the world, with nearly 35 million domestic and international passengers; principal gateway for visitors traveling to Port Canaveral, the second largest cruise port in the nation

Orlando-Sanford International Airport (SFB): home of Aerosim Flight Academy, which trains prospective regional airline and international pilots, making it among the 30 busiest airports in the world

Orlando Executive Airport (ORL): a landing site and staging area for Marine Helicopter Squadron One (VMX-1) and supporting helicopter operations during Presidential visits to Orlando

Kissimmee Gateway Airport (ISM): protects the Disney Temporary Flight Restricted Area immediately to its northwest, and hosts the local County Sheriff's Air Unit, the closest responder to Central Florida's theme parks

Mass Transit and Commuter Rail

Florida's Turnpike: the third most heavily travelled toll road in the U.S.

Interstate 4: 200,000 drivers daily through downtown Orlando

LYNX Commuter Bus System: 85,000 daily riders and over 30 million total passenger trips in FY 2014

SunRail: nearly 4,000 passengers daily

Oil and Natural Gas Facilities

Sabal Trail Natural Gas Pipeline: this new \$3 billion project will form part of a 465-mile interstate natural gas pipeline for Florida Power and Light Company

Border Index

The 'Border Index' is comprised of 'international waters,' 'international borders,' and 'border crossings.' While the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA does not contain international waters or international borders, millions of international border crossing occur at area airports. The FY 2016 draft risk profile notes that there were 2,715,469 air crossings into the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA.

It is important to note, however, than a June 2015 report entitled 'Overseas Visitation Estimates for U.S. States, Cities, and Census Regions: 2014' prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Travel and Tourism Industries states that Orlando received more than four million international visitors – *excluding* visitors from Canada and Mexico. This number puts Orlando fourth among all American cities for number of overseas visitors annually (behind only New York City, Miami, and Los Angeles). This discrepancy must be addressed before any MSA risk profile for FY 2016 can be finalized.

Given the significant number of high-visibility targets in the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA, including the largest and most famous tourist attraction in the world, there is substantial reason to believe that this MSA is more likely to be attacked than others. Furthermore, the high number of border crossings and international visitors in the area are grounds to increase, rather than decrease, the current 2016 risk profile for the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA.

Consequence Component


The third and final component of the FY 2016 risk analysis is the 'Consequence Component.' This component is comprised of four indices: population (population density, commuters, and visitors); economic (GDP); national infrastructure; and national security.

Given the population of the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA, the large number of visitors it hosts each year, the significant number of U.S. corporations that operate in the area, and the disproportionate impact a terrorist attack would have on our region's GDP – the world's largest tourist destination – I do not understand how our area received in a Consequence Index score of 34, barely an increase from FY 2015's rank of 35. I believe the factors outlined above require a higher FY 2016 risk profile.

I thank you for the opportunity to express my concerns regarding the methodology by which the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford risk profile was determined. Again, I ask that you reexamine those areas in which I have expressed concern, and assign the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA a higher relative risk score than 34.

Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this letter, please do not hesitate to contact Mike Nichola, of my staff, at 202-225-9889 or Mike.Nichola@mail.house.gov.

Sincerely,


Alan Grayson
Alan Grayson
Member of Congress

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515
January 27, 2016

The Honorable Jeh Johnson
 Secretary
 US Department of Homeland Security
 301 7th Street SW, Mail Stop 0150
 Washington, DC 20528-0150

Dear Secretary Johnson:

Earlier this month the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, Florida statistical area received its 2016 MSA Risk Profile Rank. Although other regions of the country may be seeing an increase of individual risk, causing the Orlando area's rank to drop, it is our belief that Central Florida's risk is being inaccurately calculated. This dramatically affects their UASI funding and impacts the region's ability to properly prepare for potential threats and react to an event accordingly.

The Orange County Sheriff's office and Chief of Police for Orlando sent the Department of Homeland Security a letter of appeal regarding their 2016 risk profile. We write to you in support of that appeal.


The Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL statistical area received funding in prior years, allowing them to purchase equipment, coordinate planning, conduct training, execute readiness exercises and enhance regional communications for all disciplines. A few examples of projects that have been funded by the UASI are the nationally recognized Fusion Center (Central Florida Intelligence Exchange), Regional Urban Search and Rescue Team (FL Task Force 4), Regional Hazardous Materials teams, Regional EOD teams and enhancements of the National Infrastructure Protection program in the Central Florida area.

With the miscalculation or the lowered ranking of the statistical area, they will not receive appropriate funding and thus the continuation of these important and similar initiatives are significantly jeopardized.

Central Florida is a target of opportunity and vulnerable to all types of terrorist activities. Orlando is ranked 4th in the Top U.S. Destinations for Foreign Travelers reported by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Office of Travel and Tourism Industries. The MSA has over 2.3 million residents and the Population Index indicates 211 million additional visitor days are spent in the area yearly. It also holds the second largest college in the U.S., two international airports and countless military and defense contractors.

If Central Florida became a target, it would be a national disaster. This is why we encourage you to support Central Florida's appeal request and reassess the Risk Profile Rank.

Sincerely,



John L. Mica
 Member of Congress

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER



Daniel Webster
 Member of Congress



November 4, 2015


Brian E. Kamoie, Assistant Administrator
 Federal Emergency Management Agency
 for Grant Programs
 U. S. Department of Homeland Security
 500 C Street S.W.
 Washington, DC 20472

Dear Mr. Kamoie:

The Orange County Sheriff's Office is in support of a petition to be filed by the Orlando/Orange Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) to combine the three Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA), Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville (Brevard), and Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach (Volusia), into one East Central Florida MSA. From the inception of the Orlando/Orange UASI, a regional approach was put into practice to assist surrounding MSAs whose Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Relative Risk Profiles have always scored below the funding line. This logical and necessary decision served to strengthen the entire East Central Florida region and the state of Florida against terrorist attacks. The Orlando/Orange UASI has been consistent partners with our agency as well as other agencies in our county for regional emergency response, intelligence information gathering and sharing, disaster planning, training programs, equipment, and exercises.

In 2015, the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA dropped five rankings on the funding list to 32 from 27 in 2012. Since Congress decided to fund only 28 MSAs, the Orlando/Orange UASI was not eligible to receive any funding to continue current projects or create new projects. Although the Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville and Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach defined MSA regions function as part of an urban region in East Central Florida, they are not combined into the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford DHS Relative Risk Profile.

In the *Federal Register, Part IV, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 2010 Standards for Delineating Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas*, Notice D., it states, "a Core Based Statistical Area (CBSA) is a geographic entity associated with at least one core of 10,000 or more population, plus adjacent territory that has a high degree of social and economic integration with the core as measured by commuting ties." The East Central Florida Region meets all the measures and thresholds in the *Federal Register*, under Notice D., Section 4: Merging of Adjacent Core Based Statistical Areas. Many residents of the Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville and Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach metro areas commute to Orange County to attend the nation's second largest university, the University of Central Florida. They also commute to Orange, Osceola, and Seminole counties for employment to include the second largest convention center in the nation, the world's top theme parks, the thriving hospitality industry, as well as global aerospace and military defense businesses.



Mr. Brian E. Kamoe
November 4, 2015
Page Two

Besides the University of Central Florida, the East Central Florida region also has numerous Community and private colleges including Daytona State College, Seminole State College, Valencia College, Stetson University, Bethune-Cookman College, Adventist University of Health Sciences, Hindu University of America, Johnson University, Reformed Theological Seminary, as well as numerous trade and technical institutions.

In addition to the commuting ties, the East Central Florida region is a favorite tourism location from a domestic and international perspective (in 2014 Orange County became the first destination to surpass 60 million visitors and set new record for U.S. Tourism Industry), a factor that immediately elevates the threat of terrorism from sources outside of the continental United States.

Some of the more popular tourist destinations within the three MSAs are as follows:

Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA:

Walt Disney World, International Drive, Universal Resort, Orlando International Airport, Orange County Convention Center, Disney's Magic Kingdom, Disney's Epcot Center, Disney's Animal Kingdom, Disney's Hollywood Studios, Universal Islands of Adventure, SeaWorld, Universal Studios, Disney's Typhoon Lagoon, Disney's Blizzard Beach, Aquatica, The Mall at Millenia, Amway Center, Wet n' Wild, Discovery Cove, International Drive tourist corridor, Dr. Phillips Performing Arts Center, Florida's Citrus Bowl, Disney's Wide World of Sports, and Orlando City Soccer Stadium.

Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville (Brevard) MSA:

Kennedy Space Center (This site has provided the United States of America an aeronautical, military, imaging and extra-planetary capability.), Port Canaveral- the second-busiest port in the world (forecasted to be the busiest cruise terminal in the world in 2016), Cocoa Beach Pier (Cocoa Beach - world famous for its beaches and surfing), Lori Wilson Beach Park (Cocoa Beach), Merritt Island National Wildlife Refuge, Patrick Air Force Base, Brevard Naval Sub Base (Trident submarine port), and Cape Canaveral Air Force Station.

Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach (Volusia) MSA:

Daytona Beach International Speedway, World famous Daytona beach, Daytona Beach Boardwalk, Ponce Inlet (New Smyrna Beach), and LPGA International which serves as host of numerous LPGA Tour Championships.

Mr. Brian E. Kamoie
November 4, 2015
Page Three

Benefits for sustainment of federal funding for emergency response and preparedness include:

- Central Florida Intelligence Exchange (Fusion Center) to gather and share critical intelligence information regionally and statewide;
- Training for all disciplines to prevent, prepare, respond, and recover from a critical terrorist incident;
- Sustains Florida Task Force 4, a Regional Urban Search and Rescue Team located in Central Florida;
- Sustains Regional Hazardous Materials Teams;
- Supports Regional training facilities both for Hazardous Materials and Urban Search and Rescue; and
- Critical equipment purchases for law enforcement response and terrorism prevention.

In closing, I respectfully request that actions be taken on the petition to merge the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, and Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville into one larger MSA/CBSA which will create an appropriate and realistic Relative Risk Score/Rank reflective of the uniqueness of the region to enable the Department of Homeland Security UASI grant program to secure federal funds for the benefit of the East Central Florida Region.

Sincerely,



Jerry L. Demings
Sheriff of Orange County

JLD/tlm

DANIEL WEBSTER
10th DISTRICT, FLORIDA
COMMITTEE ON RULES
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION
AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-0908

WASHINGTON OFFICE
1019 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-3276
(202) 225-0999 (FAX)

WINTER GARDEN OFFICE
300 WEST PLANT STREET
WINTER GARDEN, FL 34787
(407) 654-5705
(407) 654-5334 (FAX)

March 27, 2014

The Honorable John Carter
Chairman
House Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Homeland Security
H-305, The Capitol
Washington, D.C. 20510

The Honorable David Price
Ranking Member
House Committee on Appropriations
Subcommittee on Homeland Security
H-305, The Capitol
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Carter and Ranking Member Price:

Central Florida is home to many world class tourist destinations and convention space. More than 50 million people visit Central Florida each year, yet these are not taken into account during the threat assessment conducted by the Department of Homeland Security for the purpose of administering the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program.

As you prepare to develop the Fiscal Year 2015 Homeland Security Appropriations bill, I respectfully request that you include report language encouraging the Secretary of Homeland Security to consider the total average daily population of metropolitan statistical areas in assessing threats for the purpose of UASI grants.

Report Language Request: Consideration of total average daily population of MSAs for UASI Grants: The Committee recognizes the importance of the Department of Homeland Security's State Homeland Security Grant Program and Urban Area Security Initiative grants for partnering with state and local law enforcement in planning and preparation for, prevention of and response to a homeland security incident. The Committee believes that the Secretary of Homeland Security, in conducting vulnerability and threat assessments of metropolitan statistical areas, should take into consideration increases in average daily population resulting from high levels of tourism.

I encourage you to include this important report language in the Fiscal Year 2015 Homeland Security Appropriations bill. Thank you for your consideration of my request.

Sincerely,

EMAIL VIA WEBSITE: webster.house.gov

Daniel Webster
Member of Congress

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

February 12, 2014

The Honorable Jeh Johnson
Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Secretary Johnson:

We, the undersigned, respectfully request that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) reexamine and correct the FY 2014 risk profile for the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).

The draft profile issued on January 30, 2014, assigned the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA a relative risk score of 32. This score is lower than the FY2013 ranking (30), and markedly below the FY2012 ranking (27).

We fail to see how this reduced ranking can be justified when every risk component in the formula – Threat (30%) – Vulnerability (20%) – Consequence (50%) – shows an increased risk to the region, and most certainly not a decreased one. We therefore request that your risk profile review assign a relative risk score that more accurately reflects the heightened security concerns of the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA that we proudly represent.

Threat Component

The 'Threat Component' of the relative risk formula is defined as:

An assessment compiled by DHS/I&A of credible threats to the Homeland. This assessment includes information from foreign intelligence collection and counterterrorism investigations that have revealed known and credible extremist plots, casings, threats, or aspirations. The Threat Index considers both international and domestic terrorism.

The single most significant event in 2013 that posed a "threat to the Homeland" was the bombing of the Boston Marathon. It is, therefore, critically important to note that Ibragim Todashev, a Chechen-born individual with direct ties to the Boston bombing terrorists, was living in Orlando when he was shot and killed after attacking an FBI agent and two Massachusetts State Troopers in his apartment on May 22, 2013.

This incident, together with the continuous work at Orlando International Airport to avert both domestic and international attacks, demands an enhanced FY 2014 risk profile for the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA.

Vulnerability Component

The 'Vulnerability Component' of the relative risk formula is comprised of two indices, the 'Targeted Infrastructure Index' and the 'Border Index'.

Targeted Infrastructure Index

The 'Targeted Infrastructure Index' is defined as:

A subset of the DHS/IP Level 1/Level 2 count that represents assets/systems in the MSA within sectors that DHS/I&A deems terrorists are more likely to attack, including: aviation, mass transit and commuter rail; oil and natural gas facilities (refineries, storage facilities, tankers, and pipelines); and large public facilities and venues (hotels, resorts, stadiums and arenas, and large office buildings).

It is clear that every category identified above favors a higher FY 2014 risk profile ranking for the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA. Indeed, a review of the area's "relevant assets/systems" highlights the following potential targets:

Large Public Facilities and Venues

Walt Disney World: a 25,000 acre complex with four theme parks, 24 themed resorts, two water parks, and several additional venues; the complex is the most visited attraction in the world, with approximately 52.5 million visitors per year

Universal Studios Florida: the eighth-most visited theme park in the U.S. with nearly 6 million visitors per year

Sea World Orlando: the ninth-most visited amusement park in the U.S. with more than 5 million visitors per year

Orange County Convention Center: the second largest convention center in the U.S.; hosts more than one million attendees per year

University of Central Florida: the second largest university in the nation

Central Florida Research Park: the fourth largest research park in the nation by number of companies, and the seventh largest in the nation by number of employees

Aviation

Orlando International Airport (MCO): the 13th-busiest airport in the U.S. and the 29th busiest airport in the world, with nearly 35 million domestic and international passengers; principal gateway for visitors travelling to Port Canaveral, the second largest cruise port in the nation

Orlando-Sanford International Airport (SFB): home of Aerosim Flight Academy, which trains prospective regional airline and international pilots, making it among the 30th busiest airports in the world because of flight training operations

Orlando Executive Airport (ORL): a landing site and staging area for Marine Helicopter Squadron One (VMX-1) and supporting helicopter operations during Presidential visits to Orlando

Kissimmee Gateway Airport (ISM): protects the Disney Temporary Flight Restricted Area immediately to its Northwest, and hosts the local County Sheriff's Air Unit which is the closest responder to Central Florida's theme parks

Mass Transit and Commuter Rail

Florida's Turnpike: the third most heavily travelled toll road in the U.S.

Interstate 4: 200,000 drivers daily through downtown Orlando

LYNX Commuter Bus System: 84,000 daily riders and 30 million total passenger trips in FY 2013

SunRail: Phase I of this new 34-mile long commuter rail will open in 2014 and carry an estimated 4,300 passengers daily

Oil and Natural Gas Facilities

Sabal Trail Natural Gas Pipeline: this new \$3 billion project will form part of a 465-mile interstate natural gas pipeline for Florida Power and Light Company

Border Index

The 'Border Index' is comprised of 'international waters', 'international borders', and 'border crossings'. While the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA does not contain international waters or international borders, millions of international border crossings occur at area airports. The FY2014 risk profile notes that there were 2,345,082 air crossings into the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA.

It is important to note, however, that an August 2013 report entitled 'Overseas Visitation Estimates for U.S. States, Cities, and Census Regions: 2012' prepared by the U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Travel and Tourism Industries states that Orlando received more than three million international visitors – excluding visitors from Canada and Mexico. This number puts Orlando fourth among all American cities for number of overseas visitors annually (behind only New York City, Miami, and Long Angeles-Long Beach). This discrepancy must be addressed before any MSA risk profile for FY2014 can be finalized.

Given the significant number of high-visibility targets in the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA, including the largest and most famous tourist attraction in the world, there is substantial reason to believe that this MSA is more likely to be attacked than others. Furthermore, the high number of border crossings and international visitors in the area are grounds to increase, rather than decrease, the current 2014 risk profile for the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA.

Consequence Component

The third and final component of the FY2014 risk analysis is the 'Consequence Component'. This component is comprised of four indices: population (population density, commuters, and visitors); economic (GDP); national infrastructure, and national security.

Given the population of the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA, the large number of visitors it hosts each year, the significant number of U.S. corporations that operate in the area, and the disproportionate impact a terrorist attack would have on our region's GDP – the world's largest tourist destination, we do not understand how these factors could have produced a lower Consequence Component score than in previous years. The draft risk profile your agency provided does not contain the information that would allow us to review the data used to calculate your rankings. We therefore ask that you make this data available for us to review before finalizing any MSA risk profile for FY2014.


We thank you for the opportunity to express our concerns regarding the methodology by which the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford risk profile was determined. We ask that you reexamine those areas in which we have expressed concern, and look forward to receiving the data we have requested.


Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this letter, please do not hesitate to contact our offices.

Sincerely,


Bill Posey
Member of Congress


Alan Grayson
Member of Congress


Corrine Brown
Member of Congress


John Mica
Member of Congress


Daniel Webster
Member of Congress

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Sheriff Demings.
Let me recognize Orlando Chief Mina now. Welcome, and you're recognized.

STATEMENT OF CHIEF JOHN MINA

Chief MINA. Good morning, Chairman Mica, Chairman DeSantis, members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to testify and allowing me to provide an overview of the immense security challenges we face on a daily basis in Central Florida and our use of the Urban Area Security Initiative funding.

On behalf of the City of Orlando, I want to offer our thoughts and prayers to the victims, and families and friends of those victims in Nice, France, as well.

As the committee is well aware, on June 12, Orlando fell victim to the second largest terrorist attack in history on U.S. soil. A self-radicalized extremist entered the Pulse nightclub at 2:02 and began shooting at the more than 300 patrons that were inside the club. Fortunately, an Orlando police officer working an extra duty assignment at the nightclub immediately engaged the suspect, and within minutes, more arriving officers broke a large window to enter the club. Within minutes, more arriving officers entered, and the suspect retreated into a bathroom, where he was isolated and holding hostage. The suspect reemerged into a hallway, where officers exchanged gunfire with him, forcing him to retreat into the bathroom. Immediately afterwards, the suspect was contained, and officers on the dance floor began to evacuate the victims out of the club.

That night, we were faced with many challenges, as the suspect claimed to have explosives that were strategically placed throughout the nightclub, including suicide vests that he was going to place on the victims. Although faced with almost certain death if the suspect detonated any explosives, officers remained in the nightclub and, instead, pulled many of the critically injured victims out to safety, transporting them to the hospital in the back of police vehicles.

For the next 3 hours, the suspect held hostages and talked on the phone with crisis negotiators, where he pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. After negotiations broke down, we were forced to breach the concrete wall using explosives and a BearCat armored vehicle to save the remaining hostages and victims and make contact with the suspect.

As rescue efforts were underway, the suspect emerged from one of the holes created by our armored vehicle and engaged our SWAT officers in gunfire. The suspect's rampage was ended at that time. Forty-nine innocent victim tragically lost their lives.

The Orlando Police Department our regional partners have prepared for these types of incidents since the Columbine massacre. And although I believe we demonstrated great courage and resolve to mitigate this horrible tragedy, but we can always learn from our actions and work to make them even better.

I would like to share with you some of the unique characteristics that make the Central Florida region an ideal target for terrorism. We have a combined resident population of 3.7 million people, and

in 2015 Orlando, had an increase in tourist population from 62 million to 66.1 million in one year, making it the number one tourist destination. Orlando is ranked number four in the top U.S. destinations for foreign travelers. Six of the top 50 attractions in the world are in the Orlando-Kissimmee area, in our UASI region. And although our resident population is 3.7 million, that number grows exponentially every day as millions of visitors call Orlando home while they live in our hundreds of area hotels and visit all of our region's venues.

The Central Florida region seeks funding under the UASI grant program on an annual basis. And the purpose of UASI is to enhance our capabilities to prevent, protect, and respond to, and recover from not only terrorism, but a broad range of other threats and hazards affecting our entire region. The intent of this funding allows us to establish measurable ratings priorities and balance threats and consequences.

Since 2002, when the Homeland Security Act was signed into law by President George W. Bush, the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA received UASI grant funds annually from 2004 until 2012. However, the funding stream drastically changed in the past 4 years. Starting in 2013 and continuing up to 2016, the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford area has not ranked high enough in relative risk score to receive UASI funding even though we are ranked number one on the MSA for domestic visitor population in the Consequence section of the formula.

From 2012 to 2016, our area has appealed the relative risk score and asked the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA to reassess the data. In May, members from our region traveled here to Washington, D.C., and met with representatives from the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA regarding the concerning threats to our region and the lack of UASI funding our region has received.

These critically needed funds are used to strengthen our region's preparedness and competency in prevention, protection, response, and recovery.

The UASI funding we have received in the past has assisted in accomplishing many goals. Hazmat training has been provided for individuals to participate in various recognized and approved technician and specialist level courses specific to identified required competencies. There have been trainings, including intelligence, bomb training, incident command training, fusion center training, radiological and nuclear detection training, and interoperable and communication training. Through these training exercises, we have strengthened our core capabilities within our UASI region. The majority of the UASI funds that we receive are allocated—are used to purchase and sustain protective equipment within the region. This includes the continuation and build-out of a camera and video surveillance system which supports our protection plan.

When complete, this program will give us access to approximately 500 cameras which can be viewed remotely from fixed and mobile command centers. This ability will aid us in the protection, prevention, as well as response and recovery from an act of terrorism or natural disaster that would directly affect the area's crit-

ical infrastructure and identify venues that are key resources to sustaining the economic viability of our region.

We have also utilized UASI programs to fund regional exercises, subsequent after action reports, and improvement plans. The last full-scale exercise in 2013 funded by UASI was a medical surge exercise at the Orlando International Airport, which involved multiple hospitals in the surrounding six counties and the city of Orlando. These vital tools have assisted us in measuring and gauging the progress of regional collaboration and communications capabilities within the Orlando metro area.

It is absolutely critical that we as a region monitor and keep up with emerging trends, improvements in technology, updates to equipment.

Due to the lack of funding in the past 4 years, this has caused serious response and mitigation constraints as a whole. From a law enforcement perspective, this affects the much needed training and equipment for our bomb teams in Central Florida to have the opportunity to train and purchase equipment needed for adequate bomb response. This was a critical component to the Pulse night-club incident.

In 2015, we identified through gap analysis a need to purchase a tactical robot for our SWAT teams and refurbished one of the aging regional bomb robots. Due to lack of funding, these programs we not funded.

Finally, for the last few years, we have sought funding through the UASI grant program to conduct Swift Assisted Victim Extraction, or SAVE, training for the region. This critical training teaches law enforcement and fire service the tactics and skills necessary to save lives. In a typical response to an active shooter casualty incident, fire personnel will stage a safe distance from the scene until law enforcement declares the scene is clear, even though law enforcement is confident they have captured, contained, or killed the suspects. This course is designed to teach law enforcement officers and the fire department the tactics necessary to enter a semi-secure area, which will reduce time to render aid to victims and save their lives. Without continued training, these perishable skills would surely deteriorate.

In closing, I would like to bring to the attention of the committee, the paradigms of traditional terror attacks are changing. In the past, our identified critical infrastructures were and obviously still are targets of terror attacks.

Based on the horrific event we experienced at the Orlando Pulse nightclub and that of the brave Dallas police officers who gave their lives while protecting innocent civilians last week, I urge the committee to consider that these attacks are becoming more frequent at venues identified as soft targets. I ask the committee review the relative risk formula to better address the risk profile unique to the Central Florida region, also known as the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford MSA.

I would personally like to thank Congressman Mica for his continued and unwavering support, not only from the Pulse assistance, but your assistance with the UASI grant funding.

I would also like to thank the committee for allowing me the opportunity to give my statement today, and I look forward to any questions. Thank you.

[Prepared statement of Chief Mina follows:]



Statement of John W. Mina

Chief of Police

Orlando Police Department

Before the

U.S. House of Representatives

House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

Concerning

“Oversight of the Urban Area Security Initiative”

Friday, July 15, 2016

2154 Rayburn House Office Building

Chairman Mica, Chairman DeSantis, and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for inviting me to testify and allowing me to provide an overview of the immense security challenges that we face on a daily basis in the Central Florida Region, and the Orlando Police Department's use of the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) funding.

As the Committee is aware, on June 12, 2016, Orlando fell victim to the second largest terrorist attack in history on U.S. soil. Omar Mateen, a self-radicalized extremist, entered the Pulse nightclub at 2:02 a.m. and began shooting at the more than 300 patrons that were inside the club. Fortunately, an Orlando Police Officer, working in an extra-duty assignment at the nightclub, immediately engaged the suspect. Within minutes, more arriving officers broke a large window and entered the nightclub to search for the suspect. Once they found him, officers drove him back into the bathroom where he was isolated and holding hostages. The suspect re-emerged into the hallway, where officer exchanged gunfire with him, forcing him to retreat back into the bathroom. Immediately after the suspect was contained, officers on the dance floor began to evacuate victims out of the club. That night, we were faced with many challenges as the suspect claimed to have explosives that were strategically placed throughout the nightclub, including suicide vests that he was going to place on victims. Although faced with almost certain death if the suspect detonated any explosives, officers remained in the nightclub, and instead pulled many of the critically injured victims out to safety, transporting them to the hospital in the back of police vehicles. For the next three hours, the suspect held hostages and talked on the phone with crisis negotiators where he pledged his allegiance to the Islamic State. After negotiations broke down, we were forced to breach the concrete wall using explosives and our Bearcat Armored vehicle to save the remaining hostages and victims and make contact with the suspect. As rescue efforts were underway, the suspect emerged from one of the holes created by our armored vehicle and engaged our SWAT officers in gunfire. The suspect's rampage was ended at that time. Forty-nine (49) innocent victims tragically lost their lives. This was the darkest day I have ever had to endure in my 25 years in law enforcement. The Orlando Police Department and our regional partners have prepared for these types of incidents since the Columbine massacre. Although I believe we demonstrated great courage and resolve to mitigate this horrible tragedy, we can always learn from our actions and work to make them even better.

I would like to share with you the unique characteristics that make the Central Florida region an ideal target for terrorism:

- We have a combined resident population of 3.7 million people. In

2015, Orlando had an increase in tourist population from 62 million to **66.1 million in one year, making it the No. 1 tourist destination.**

- Orlando is ranked at **#4 in Top U.S. Destinations for Foreign Travelers** as reported by the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Office of Travel and Tourism Industries, and the International Trade Administration.
- 6 of the top 50 attractions in the world are in the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL UASI region.
- Although our resident population was 3.7 million, that number grows exponentially every day as millions of visitors call Orlando “home” while they live in our hundreds of area hotels and visit all of our region’s venues.

The Central Florida Region seeks funding under the UASI grant program on an annual basis. The purpose of the UASI is to enhance our capabilities to prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from not only terrorism, but also a broad range of other threats and hazards affecting our entire region. The intent of this funding allows us to establish measurable readiness priorities and balance threats and consequences.

Since 2002, when the Homeland Security Act of 2002 was signed into law by President George W. Bush, the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) received UASI grant funds annually from 2004 until 2012, except for fiscal year 2005. However, the funding stream drastically changed in the past four (4) years. Starting in 2013, continuing up to 2016, the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL MSA has not ranked high enough in relative risk score to receive UASI funding even though we are ranked number one (1) on the MSA for domestic visitor population in the Consequence section of the formula. From 2012 to 2016, the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL MSA has appealed the relative risk score and asked the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA to reassess the data. It should be noted that in 2014, our region did receive \$1 million dollars from Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson in the way of discretionary funds, but it was not based on our MSA ranking. In May, members from our region traveled here to Washington D.C. and met with representatives from the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA regarding the concerning threats to our region and the lack of UASI funding our region has received. These critically-needed funds are used to strengthen our region’s preparedness and competency in prevention, protection, response, and recovery and are used to implement our National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), strengthen Interoperable Communications, and expand Regional Collaboration.

The UASI funding we have received in the past has assisted us in accomplishing

many goals. Training has occurred across all five disciplines (Law Enforcement, Fire, Medical/Health, Interoperability, and Emergency Management). Hazmat training has been provided for individuals to participate in various recognized and approved technician and specialist-level courses specific to identified required competencies. Other trainings include Intelligence training, FDLE Bomb training, FBI HazMat training, NIMS/ICS Position Specific training, Fusion Center training, USAR training, Radiological/Nuclear Detection training, and operable and Interoperable communications training. Through these training exercises, we have strengthened our core capabilities within our UASI region.

The majority of UASI funds that we receive are allocated and used to purchase and sustain protective equipment within the region. This includes the continuation and build-out of a camera and video surveillance system which supports our Protection Plan. When complete, this program will give us access to approximately 500 cameras, which can be viewed remotely from fixed and mobile command centers. This ability will aide us in the protection, prevention, as well as in the response and recovery from an act of terrorism or natural disaster that would directly affect the area's critical infrastructure and identified venues that are key resources to sustaining the economic viability of our region.

We have also utilized UASI programs to fund regional exercises with their subsequent After Action Reports and Improvement Plans. The last full scale exercise in 2013 funded by the UASI was the Medical Surge exercise at the Orlando International Airport, which involved multiple hospitals in the surrounding six counties and the City of Orlando. These vital tools have assisted us in measuring and gauging the progress of regional collaboration and communication capabilities within the Orlando Metro Area. In addition to training, organization funds from the UASI grant went towards our Central Florida Intelligence Exchange (CFIX) Fusion Center analysts and operations. Since 2006, CFIX, which is nationally recognized, has been online and fully operational. The Central Florida Intelligence Exchange Fusion Center is able to share information throughout various agencies in Florida. Capabilities strengthened through this process include:

- Intelligence / Information Sharing and Dissemination
- Intelligence Analysis and Production

It is absolutely critical that we, as a region, monitor and keep up with emerging trends, improvements in technology, and updates to equipment. Due to the lack of funding in the past four (4) years, this has caused serious response and mitigation constraints as a whole. From a law enforcement perspective, this affects the much needed training and equipment for our bomb teams in Central Florida, including the City of Orlando, to have the opportunity to train or purchase equipment needed

for adequate bomb response. This was a critical component to the Orlando Pulse nightclub incident.

In 2015, we identified through gap analysis, a need to purchase a tactical robot for our SWAT teams and refurbish one of our aging regional bomb robots. Due to the lack of funding, these projects were not funded. Interoperable communication funding, which was a UASI proposed project in fiscal years 2013-2016 in order to ensure seamless interoperable radio communication between agencies within our region, was not funded and, therefore, we are not able to build out and strengthen communications with our multiple local, state, and federal partners.

Finally, for the last two (2) years, we have sought funding through the UASI grant program to conduct Swift Assisted Victim Extraction (S.A.V.E.) training for the region. This critical training teaches law enforcement and the fire service the tactics and skills necessary to save lives. In a typical response to an active shooter/mass casualty incident, fire personnel will "stage" a safe distance from the scene until law enforcement declares the scene as "clear" even though law enforcement is confident that they have captured, contained, or killed the suspect(s). This course is designed to teach law enforcement officers and the fire department the tactics necessary to enter a "semi-secure" area, which will reduce time to render aid to victims and save their lives. Without continued training, these perishable skills would surely deteriorate.

In closing, I would like to bring to the attention of the Committee that the paradigms of traditional terror attacks are changing. In the past, our identified critical infrastructures were, and obviously still are, targets of terror attacks. Based on the horrific event we experienced at the Orlando Pulse nightclub, and that of the brave Dallas Police Officers, who gave their lives while protecting innocent civilians last week, I urge the committee to consider that these attacks are becoming more frequent at venues identified as "soft targets." The Central Florida region survives on tourism, and is, thereby, filled with world-reknowned venues that are "soft targets." I ask that the Committee review the relative risk formula to better address the risk profile unique to the Central Florida region, also known as the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL MSA.

I would personally like to thank Congressman Mica for his continued and unwavering support, from the Pulse incident, to his assistance with the UASI grant funding. I would also like to thank the Committee for allowing me the opportunity to give my opening statement today. I look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Chief Mina.

And we'll hear from our last witness, Mr. Walter Purdy, President of the Terrorism Research Center. Welcome, and you're recognized, sir.

STATEMENT OF WALTER PURDY

Mr. PURDY. Well thank you, Chairman Mica, Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Member Lynch and other distinguished members of this committee. Thank you for inviting me today to testify about this very important issue.

The terrorism threat in America is one that is constantly evolving. In the wake of the terrorist attacks last night in Nice, previous attacks in Paris, Brussels, Boston, Charleston, Chattanooga, Garland, San Bernardino, and Orlando, the last thing we should be doing is reducing the levels of funding to certain cities that need these funds to protect America.

It is truly unthinkable at this time that President Obama's 2017 budget reduces the level of funding for Homeland Security initiatives through the Urban Area Security Initiative, known as UASI, as well as in other funding mechanisms to protect the homeland. The threat to America from terrorists has not gone away and is constantly evolving.

The director of the FBI, James Comey, has warned that the FBI is investigating ISIS suspects in over 50 States, with more than 900 active investigations. Just this last week on the front page of the Washington Post, Adam Goldman wrote an article talking about 92 ISIS individuals here in the United States.

Even the funding for State and local antiterrorism training, SLAT, conducted through the Department of Justice, has been reduced and cut back. Talking to an individual with that bureau yesterday, they said, I'm not sure what we're going to do to help local law enforcement that needs this critical training today. Yet the terrorism threat to America seems to continue to grow.

Last week, Secretary of Homeland Security Johnson testified at a Senate hearing on funding for Homeland Security. He said he was constrained by the budget agreement, wasn't happy, but had to make hard choices. Yes, we all know budgets restrain people, but we have to think about how we're spending those resources and giving those communities, and cities, counties, and regions that need them the tools and resources to do the job to protect American citizens, and as you just heard, all the tourists that go and visit the Orlando area.

If the terrorism threat to America was reduced to going away, I would be the first one to support a reduction in funding both for UASI and the Department of Homeland Security, but we all know this threat is not going anywhere. It's actually increasing.

Today, we see homeland radicalized terrorists conducting attacks, as we saw in San Bernardino. We see individuals 1.2 miles from my residence in Fairfax, Virginia, getting locked up last Friday. We see out in Sterling, Virginia, individuals, inspired by ISIS, going and purchasing weapons, seeking to attack targets in this particular region.

We need to be funding local law enforcement. They are the first responders. Both the police and sheriff's department, and the officers in Orlando bravely dealt with that particular critical incident. Yet we're asking the law enforcement community in places, and first responders, firefighters and others, to deal with this ever-growing, complex challenge as funding levels in places get cut. We can't expect law enforcement as a community is going to be prepared to deal with these changing situations over time when we're cutting funds.

UASI funds, Homeland Security programs, Congress has heard from mayors, chiefs of police, sheriffs across from America, that have lobbied for a departure and a reexamination of how the funding takes place. The threat is real. I would ask you to kind of change the direction and approach in which these funds and mechanisms provide critical resources and assistance to those first responders in America. Training is critical. It is a critical step to getting individuals so they can respond effectively to this growing threat.

I thank you for the time today and look forward to answering any questions. Thank you so much.

[Prepared statement of Mr. Purdy follows:]

The Evolving Terrorism Threat in America and the Urban Area Security Initiative Grant Program

Walter Purdy

Terrorism Research Center

July 15, 2016

Testimony presented before the House Subcommittees on
Transportation and Public Assets and National Security

Walter Purdy
Terrorism Research Center Inc.

**Before the Subcommittee on National Security
And Transportation and Public Assets
United States House of Representatives**

July 15, 2015

Chairman Mica, Chairman DeSantis, Ranking Members Duckworth, and Lynch, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on this important issue. The terrorism threat in America is one that is constantly evolving. In the wake of the terrorist attacks in Paris, Brussels, Boston, Charleston, Chattanooga, Garland, San Bernardino, and Orlando, the last thing we should be doing is reducing the level of funding that is aimed to protect America. It is unthinkable that President Obama's budget reduces the level of funding for homeland security through the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) as well as in other funding mechanisms to protect the homeland. The threat to America from terrorists has not gone away or been reduced. The Director of the FBI, James Comey has warned that the FBI is investigating ISIS suspects in all 50 states with more than 900 investigations. Even the funding for State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) conducted through the Department of Justice has been reduced and cut back. Yet, the terrorism threat to America seems to be growing and evolving. Recently, the Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson testified at a Senate hearing on funding for Homeland Security that he was constrained by a budget agreement and wasn't happy but they had made hard choices. If the terrorist threat to America was reduced or going away I could support a reduction of funding to UASI and the Department of Homeland Security. But that is not the case.

Before September 11th terrorist groups like Al Qaeda sought to identify and recruit individuals to travel and train in terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. Today the plethora of terrorist groups associated with Al-Qaeda and ISIS use social media and slick on-line magazines like

Dabiq and Inspire to launch attacks wherever they may be. We have seen a large number of terrorist wannabes that have been thankfully identified, arrested and charged by law enforcement here in the United States. We can't afford to let our guard down or Congress will have to fund another 9/11 Commission when terrorists conduct a Paris or Mumbai style attack here in America. And the question the American people will want Congress to answer is "how could this have happened again in America.? Until today, we have seen homegrown radicalized terrorists conduct attacks where the attackers numbered no more than two as in the San Bernardino attack on December 2, 2015. Yet, we are asking the law enforcement community to deal with this ever growing complex challenge as funding levels are cut. We can't expect that the law enforcement community is going to be prepared in the future when funding under UASI and other Homeland Security programs are being cut. Congress has heard from mayors, chiefs of police, sheriffs across America that have lobbied for a departure from the budget being presented by President Obama in regard to this issue.

The terrorist attacks and plots that we have seen here in the United States in the last ten years should remind us all that the threat of terrorism is not going away. The threat is evolving and getting more complex as terrorists adapt to evade and defeat measures put in place to identify them here in the United States. These issues are of the utmost importance for our country's security not only today, but in the future. America can't afford a shoe string approach to funding training for the first responder community.

In the last week we have seen arrests by the FBI of individuals in Burke and Sterling, Virginia not more than 20 miles from the Capital. These two individuals were both supporters of ISIS. One was identifying targets for a purported ISIS video and the other had purchased a weapon to launch an attack. The threat is real and I would ask you to change the direction and approach to funding UASI and other mechanisms that provide the resources and assistances needed by first responders in America.

**Walter Purdy
President
Terrorism Research Center**

Walter Purdy is the President of the Terrorism Research Center (TRC), a Virginia based company that seeks to provide the best professional practices in dealing with terrorism, global issues, contemporary operating environments, asymmetrical warfare and insurgencies. TRC provides cutting edge counterterrorism research, analysis and training.

Mr. Purdy is an Adjunct Professor with the Criminology, Law and Society Department of George Mason University where he teaches Law Enforcement and Homeland Security, Introduction to Homeland Security and Use of Force Issues.

Mr. Purdy has also undertaken a number of special research projects to include: *Faces of Terrorism: Connecting the Data Points, Worldwide Study of Truck Bombings, From Munich to Manhattan and Beyond: Lessons Learned From Thirty Years of Terrorism, Emerging Threats to the United States: The Tri-Border Region, Global Study of Suicide Bombers and Attacks, The Lion Cubs: Terrorism Travel, The Hunter and the Prey: Omar Sheikh and Daniel Pearl, Europe's Elusive Terrorist Organization: 17 November, Profiles of the Taliban Leadership, Understanding the Haqqanis: How the Haqqani's View the Region, The Kidnapping Project-Captivity, Hostage-Taking and Kidnapping and others.*

He created and directs the Terrorism Research Center's Training and Special Projects Division. Mr. Purdy has trained thousands of military, law enforcement and intelligence personnel. He has traveled extensively to the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Asia. Mr. Purdy created and directs the "Mirror Image: Training to Combat Terrorism" which has placed specialized law enforcement, military and intelligence officers an understanding of terrorist training, tactics, techniques and procedures by allowing them to walk in the shoes of the terrorist to be better prepared to defeat them.

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
Witness Disclosure Requirement – “Truth in Testimony”
Required by House Rule XI, Clause 2(g)(5)

Name: WALTER PUROY

1. Please list any federal grants or contracts (including subgrants or subcontracts) you have received since October 1, 2012. Include the source and amount of each grant or contract.

Amtrak Less Than \$25,000

2. Please list any entity you are testifying on behalf of and briefly describe your relationship with these entities.

3. Please list any federal grants or contracts (including subgrants or subcontracts) received since October 1, 2012, by the entity(ies) you listed above. Include the source and amount of each grant or contract.

Amtrak Less Than \$25,000

I certify that the above information is true and correct.

Signature:

Walter Puroy

Date:

7-13-2016

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Purdy.

And I want to thank all of our witnesses today. And I'll go directly to questions.

First of all, we have a program in place, and it's been in place since 2003, many years. We provide about a billion dollars a year in funding. Well, what we've got to do is make sure we don't leave any American city or community behind. My dad used to say, and I told this to Sheriff Demings and Chief Mina this morning, my dad used to say, it's not how much you spend, it's how you spend it, and then getting money out.

In looking at—and unfortunately, we were involved in this even before the horrible Orlando terrorist massacre. We were looking at trying to see what was wrong with the formula, why we were denied, and we found several things. In the response that—I don't know if you were the—let's see who signed this, but it came back from FEMA to me, again, before—this is back February 19th. Yeah. This is from you, Brian, Mr. Kamoie. You said, DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis uses a holistic approach to analyze threat information and juxtaposed its review of intelligence community.

So, again, we've got different agencies doing different things. You're relying on information you're getting from them. I'm told some of that information is outdated. For example, in Orlando, they're using assessment data that's from 2011 on the tourism visitation. Hasn't been updated since then. Did you know that?

Mr. KAMOIE. Sir, that's not accurate. We've got more recent data than that. And we'd be glad to provide—

Mr. MICA. Well, we were told, again, that that was what was used. Maybe now there has been an update. So we're told, again, that that information, that they have, is not up-to-date. You don't do that. They do that. You analyze their data, right, their intelligence and what they supply you?

Mr. KAMOIE. So the reason we use the term "holistic" is it's a partnership between us and the Office of Intelligence and Analysis for the threat piece of the formula.

Mr. MICA. Right.

Mr. KAMOIE. Threat vulnerability and consequence. The threat piece looks at acts of terrorism, credible threats, reporting terrorism presence—

Mr. MICA. You gave us threat vulnerability, consequences, all of those things—

Mr. KAMOIE. Yes, sir.

Mr. MICA. —but, again, the information we have is some of that data on which you based, at least Orlando, was outdated. That's one.

Then, two, somewhere, and Mr. Purdy referred to it, we are missing the mark. We missed the mark dramatically in Orlando. And, again, Mr. Purdy cited it. We've had San Bernardino, we've had Boston, Mr. Lynch's community, my community, and they're hitting soft targets. We went back and tried, as you heard Sheriff Demings, because we found out that some of the basis on which you analyzed us is we didn't have a port, Orlando doesn't have a port. So money went to Tampa and then money went to Miami. They have ports.

And we tried to change the area Mr. DeSantis represents, over to Volusia County, we tried to get that in, and Brevard County, and we were denied that.

So my point here is somehow the threat assessment isn't dealing with the reality of what they're doing to us. They're coming at us in soft targets. And then we said, we are a soft target. We've got great security at Disney, at Sea World, at Universal, at these big attractions, but look at the death toll list from Orlando. These people came from all over. Young ladies who were Googling a good place to go, which was the Pulse nightclub in Orlando. They were from Philadelphia. I mean, you look at the roster of the dead and where they came, and they came to a soft target. This guy scoped, he scoped Disney and then came back and slaughtered people at that nightclub.

We are missing the mark. Now, maybe we should give the Secretary back to more discretion. Maybe we should—again, leave no community behind. Maybe we should divide the billion dollars between everybody and get some to at least address the problem.

But Orlando, Central Florida, the biggest terrorist attack in the history of the country since 9/11, got zero the last 2 years. Don't you think something's wrong?

Mr. KAMOIE. Chairman Mica, I'm going to address a number of the things that you've raised. In terms of leaving no State or city behind, the billion dollars you are referencing goes through two programs: The State Homeland Security program, \$402 million this year. That provides funding for all 50 States.

Mr. MICA. Yes.

Mr. KAMOIE. The District of Columbia and the U.S. Territories. So that is a baseline of Homeland Security funding for all jurisdictions.

Mr. MICA. Again, and maybe you're not here to speak on behalf of a policy for the Secretary of DHS and beyond, but I'm telling you we aren't getting it right. We are not getting it right. And also, just for the record, this is provided by you, daily visitors, the data is based on 2011, 2012 and 2013 survey data. This is what you gave us. Okay? So don't say that I'm incorrect. That's what you gave me.

Now, Sheriff Demings, he summed a lot of this up. We're only as good as the information that we have in intelligence. We have got to go back to getting better intelligence, connecting the dots, getting that information. Obviously, they missed the mark. We're only talking about this program. But they missed the mark with our particular terrorist, who was identified multiple times, put on a watch list, taken off a watch list. Sheriff Demings, you've got to have that information right to know who poses a risk, either coming into or in our community. Is that correct?

Sheriff DEMINGS. Congressman Mica, you are correct. And I will have to say that we have a wonderful collaborative effort between our Federal, State and local law enforcement authorities in Orlando, as I indicated, who operate out of the Central Florida Intelligence Exchange.

There is classified and unclassified information that goes through that center that assists us in responding to counterterrorism efforts as well as our day-to-day crime prevention efforts.

Mr. MICA. Well, the other thing too is, and, Mr. Purdy, you said—I think it was you—we've got to change the paradigm, the San Bernardinos, the Orlandoos, the Chattanoegas, the Bostons. They aren't done with us. This isn't over. We've got a responsibility, and if we're going to spend even one penny, it has to go most effectively.

And I'm calling today for—again, we have a billion dollars sitting there. That's another issue, a billion dollars sitting there, some of this since 2011. We've got to get that money out. It shouldn't be sitting here. So if they don't use it, we should find some way that they lose it and it goes to where people can use it.

But you saw the chart. I saw it this morning the first time. It's stunning. Almost a third of the money sitting there. Something's wrong and we've got to change it. But my time is over and extended.

Let me recognize the gentleman and Ranking Member Mr. Lynch.

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kamoie, all right, so, as the chart showed, there's about a third of the resources that were authorized but not expended. I'm rather surprised to see that the people in Boston left half a million dollars unspent, we're not known for that.

But could you explain to me why the allocation—there's two problems here: One might be the amount of resources that we're allocating; the other is the effective use, how we deploy and whether we deploy those resources to protect the people. That's my first question.

So can you explain why there is that residual amount not spent?

Mr. KAMOIE. I'd be glad to, Congressman Lynch. And I believe the word that Chairman Mica used was that the money is idle. There are three timelines that you need to keep in mind with respect to this money. The first is, it is 1-year funding when it is provided to us from the Congress, meaning we need to make the awards in the same fiscal year in which they are appropriated. So we announce the awards, we move—

Mr. LYNCH. I don't want you to burn all my time on this, because I have some more questions. But, please, if that's the case—so that money is going to be spent, is that what you're going to tell me?

Mr. KAMOIE. The money is all booked against projects that they are spending against. You can think of it as your own budget. When you have a budget at the beginning of the month and you put on your ledger that you're going to pay your mortgage on the 25th, it doesn't mean the money is idle. It means it doesn't get paid until later in the—

Mr. LYNCH. So it's targeted; it's going to be spent later.

Mr. KAMOIE. Yes.

Mr. LYNCH. You can just say that in a short amount of time. Thank you, I appreciate that. So we're going to spend that money later, it just hasn't been spent yet. Okay.

What about the factors that we're using here? Orlando, you know, they've got Disney World and all that going on. I'm sure they have huge fluctuations of population.

Manhattan, same thing. I worked there. You know, Manhattan has very little population maybe on a Saturday morning, but then

Monday morning all these millions of people come on in and there's a huge problem there.

So in the factor, in the formula, do we consider the inflow? Like, you know, some of the areas in Orlando, obviously, there's a certain season when they get swamped with people.

Mr. KAMOIE. We do. Population counted as nighttime census, meaning people who both live there, who are visitors overnight, and then people who commute during the day and leave.

Mr. LYNCH. Okay.

Mr. KAMOIE. We count all those folks. And we also count the infrastructure that you're well familiar with in Orlando.

Mr. LYNCH. Yeah. It was quite surprising to me that the Pulse Nightclub in Orlando was attacked. Just, I mean, come on. You know, who could predict that? You could say similar thoughts, as someone from Boston, the marathon, I've run that a couple of times, that is not somewhere where you would even think, but now we have to, right?

So if we're going to start protecting soft targets, the list is endless. The opportunities are endless. And you just almost get into this sort of whack-a-mole type situation where we try to guess where they might strike next. And I don't think there's anything short of full-spectrum surveillance of American society that could even approach addressing that problem, as far as something programmatic, in terms of giving people money out, you know, across these jurisdictions to sort of make sure nothing happens in their district. I don't know. That's a tall order for law enforcement and for our intelligence services.

And I'm just wondering is there a better model out there? I know that the British have put a lot of money into surveillance. They've got cameras everywhere, especially their transportation systems. We haven't done enough of that yet.

But is there another model out there, Mr. Kamoie and Mr. Purdy, that you think offers some hope?

Mr. KAMOIE. Congressman, I'll defer to the sheriff and the police chief on what the best policing tactics are to address the threat. On the financing, I can just tell you on the funding levels, you pointed out something very important in your opening statement, which is the direction that Congress gives to the Secretary about how many jurisdictions to fund, how far to spread the funding. The Secretary takes that guidance very seriously.

So Congress has a choice about the breadth of jurisdictions you wish the Department to cover with the funding. So I would encourage you to have discussions among the committee and with the appropriators about the appropriate intent that you'd like to convey to the Secretary.

Mr. LYNCH. I can just say in closing, from our own experience in Boston, the fact that we had a very robust public safety infrastructure there, we've got great—a suburb police department, fire department, emergency medical services, hospitals. They were all on-site. They were all onsite. We have a great Joint Terrorism Task Force, where FBI, DHS, State Police, local police. So I think that a lot of people were saved that day, because we had medical tents already set up, we had that infrastructure in place. We had great leadership. And that continues to this day.

So that that's sort of the first line of defense, and then the stuff that we're doing here with these special programs. So we've got to support the sheriff and the chief in their basic jobs, and then plus that up, plus that up with enhanced resources at this level. But thank you for your courtesy.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the time I don't have.

Mr. DESANTIS. [Presiding.] I thank my friend from Massachusetts. I now recognize myself for five minutes.

Sheriff Demings, the amount of people that are coming into central Florida every year, what's the ballpark estimate of how many people come to visit?

Sheriff DEMINGS. In 2015, it was 6 to 6.1 million people came to visit. And in my county, our permanent resident population is 1.3 million. So effectively, on any given day, our county population doubles, and that's the service population that we have to deal with.

Mr. DESANTIS. And those figures would put Orlando in probably the top five in the country for visitors. Is that your understanding?

Sheriff DEMINGS. It would certainly move us up from number 34, where we currently reside on the list.

Mr. DESANTIS. So you combine a huge influx of people with a lot of different soft targets. I mean, people think, oh, you know, they'll go to Disneyland or Disney World. Yeah, that's one, but there are amusement parks everywhere. There are, really, a high number of soft targets and probably more soft targets in Orlando than just about any other city certainly in the Southeast, I would say. Do you agree with that?

Sheriff DEMINGS. Certainly. Because we have now had an attack in Orlando, I believe that we will remain at risk. And that's the unfortunate thing about it. And we simply want to be prepared and prevent something from occurring. And then if it should happen, we want to be able to respond quickly.

Mr. DESANTIS. But a huge number of people and then the proliferation of soft targets, that's not really reflected in how FEMA analyzes this presently, correct?

Sheriff DEMINGS. As best as I can tell, that is perhaps some of the factors that they look at. But we are seeing a paradigm shift in the way terror suspects are identifying their targets, as Chief Mina indicated, and they are looking more at the soft targets.

Mr. DESANTIS. So, Chief, how would the funding—say this changes and you guys are getting more funding, what would be your first order of business to use that, in terms of terrorist preparedness?

Chief MINA. Well first of all, going back to the formula and the amount of visitors, and that may be factored in, but we believe, since we are such a target, that the number of visitors in our venues should hold greater weight.

But secondly, that funding has provided us with much needed training for our response and much needed equipment. But training skills perish and equipment, you know, is needed to be replaced. So, you know, just looking at the Pulse incident, there's so much more equipment that I would have liked. There's thermal imaging, to see where the suspect was behind those walls.

Sir, I met with officials from France to discuss the Paris attacks, and they had ballistic protection for their face shields for their SWAT officers, which we do not have. So there's all kinds of equipment out there, equipment—

Mr. DESANTIS. Do you guys have the—the Dallas police used the robot to deliver a bomb to kill the guy who was shooting the cops. Do you guys have access to that type of technology?

Chief MINA. We do have a similar robot. But, again, we haven't had the training to deploy such a device, as you know, the first time used ever to kill a suspect in that type of situation. But that's, again, training that could be provided with that funding.

Mr. DESANTIS. Sheriff Demings, you talked about in your testimony having Brevard and Volusia be included in that. Why is that important?

Sheriff DEMINGS. It's important because it is really—it speaks to more of how our metropolitan area functions, the infrastructure, the roadways, how we advertise our tourism destinations, how our commuters travel to and from work.

We truly are one big metropolitan area. Whenever there's an incident, let's say in Volusia involving the raceway, we support their efforts. When there is something that's going on at NASA, the Kennedy Space Center, we support the efforts there as well.

And so even with the Pulse incident, we had a regional response. There were police agencies and sheriff's officers from throughout the region in question who responded to assist us in our recovery efforts.

Mr. DESANTIS. I agree. And I join Chairman Mica in supporting your efforts to get that change.

This is just a little bit off this particular subject, but there's obviously been a lot of issues going on in our society. The Dallas shootings. So how is the morale with the Orange County Sheriff's Department for officers? Are they feeling the support that they need from the community and the public?

Sheriff DEMINGS. I've got to tell you for the last 2 years law enforcement across the Nation has been criticized mightily, sometimes justly so, sometimes unjustly so.

But what we saw happen immediately after the Pulse incident was this tremendous outpouring of support and love, if you will, that was shown to all first responders, not just the law enforcement officers. And there were various random acts of kindness to our personnel that has continued right through today. And I'm sure that Chief Mina could echo my comments and sentiments in this regard.

Mr. DESANTIS. Is that your experience?

Chief MINA. Absolutely. It's been tough times for law enforcement these past few years, but the morale is good because of the great support from our community. And we're lucky in Orlando and Orange County. We have a rich history of community policing and community engagement with our community. But there has been just a huge outpouring of support from the community.

And certainly, any time a police officer is targeted because of wearing that uniform, it is very concerning to them. So they are very on guard and aware and concerned about their own safety, but the morale is good and they feel the support from our community.

Mr. DESANTIS. Great. Well, thank you, and I am done.

And I guess we'll now recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Palmer, for five minutes.

Mr. PALMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want thank the witnesses for being here and echo the sentiment that we've already heard here about our support for law enforcement and first responders at every level. We really do appreciate you guys and want to help any way we can.

Mr. Kamoie, does FEMA have the capabilities to do evaluations of regional preparedness?

Mr. KAMOIE. We do. We've got extensive reporting by our grant recipients against core capabilities for preparedness. So we've done a great many things to advance our ability to assess preparedness.

Mr. PALMER. How long have you been doing these?

Mr. KAMOIE. The President issued Presidential Policy Directive 8 on national preparedness in 2011, and we have been working since then on identifying the core capabilities and working with our State and local partners to align investments of these grant funds against those capabilities.

Mr. PALMER. Prior to the Orlando attack, considering the high profile of that city and of that region, was there a preparedness evaluation report done for central Florida and specifically Orlando?

Mr. KAMOIE. As an Urban Area Security Initiative jurisdiction, Orlando has reported to us the funding—

Mr. PALMER. No. I'm asking, this is FEMA's responsibility. There's a GAO report. You mentioned the President's initiative. I want to know was there a report done for central Florida and specifically for the city of Orlando?

Mr. KAMOIE. I'll have to follow up with you, Congressman.

Mr. PALMER. Okay. When you follow up, I would like for you to respond to the committee as to whether or not a report was prepared, and if it was I'd like for you to provide that to the committee. Could you do that, please?

Mr. KAMOIE. I will.

Mr. PALMER. Isn't it the responsibility of the UASI program to make sure that the program's goals are met?

Mr. KAMOIE. That the program—

Mr. PALMER. Goals are met.

Mr. KAMOIE. Yes.

Mr. PALMER. One of the goals is to make sure that these regions are prepared. And what I find stunning—and I was at the classified briefing in which Mr. Mica laid some documents on the stage for Secretary Johnson.

It is stunning to me that more wasn't done to prepare Orlando for this, to view Orlando as a target. It's stunning to me that Orlando was turned down for the grant, and particularly considering the threats that we face, and it's been in an escalating nature. I mean, it's not like one happened 5 years ago and then something else happened. I mean, these things are escalating. It's almost as though the Federal Government, particularly this administration, is tone deaf or blind to it. And I just don't understand why there's a billion dollars that wasn't used. And I heard your answer a while ago that there's other things going on, but they are critical needs and Orlando should have been one of the top areas for this.

What accountability and oversight is FEMA exercising to ensure that program funds are being used effectively?

Mr. KAMOIE. We monitor 100 percent of all open awards. And where we see indications that additional monitoring is needed, we do site visits. We work both on the programmatic monitoring and financial monitoring, to make sure the funding is spent for the purposes for which it is appropriated.

Mr. PALMER. Well when you look at the fact that there's over half a billion—\$662 million, half a billion dollars that was unused from 2011, and you couldn't come up with some—

Mr. KAMOIE. The award amount was \$662 million. The award balance was—

Mr. PALMER. I'm sorry, you're right. There's half a billion was—\$1.1 billion that's left over, and it's accumulated over that time. Thank you for pointing that out.

Mr. KAMOIE. It's not idle or left over. The grantees for 2015 have 3 years to spend the money. So they are in progress with that \$585 million, and they'll spend against it until 2018. In 2014, they had a 2-year period of performance. They have until August of 2016 to spend down that funding, and when they conduct or complete large projects, they then request reimbursement.

Mr. PALMER. Are you saying that most of the funding is spent on the back end of that?

Mr. KAMOIE. I'm saying the timing for which they request reimbursement can accelerate toward the end of the period of performance. So it's a reimbursement grant. So they submit bills to us; we pay them. So that \$585 million for 2015 is ongoing. The \$445 million, the period of performance will close in August. Some projects will get legitimate extensions to their period of performance, because they're still in progress. That billion dollars is very actively being spent right now; it's not left over.

Mr. PALMER. Well, what I was asking is, is it looks like a lot of this is spent on the back end, if you've got 2014 funding and you still have \$445 million left and it closes out in August.

Mr. KAMOIE. So whether it's spent on—I mean, we reimburse on the back end, yes. As we're closing the grants, jurisdictions submit a large number of bills to us.

Mr. PALMER. I want to look into this a little bit more and make sure that I fully understand how this is done, but I want to get back to this.

I understand the senior policy group oversees the allocation and implementation of UASI funding, determines priority actions for increasing the region's preparedness and response capabilities, as well as reducing vulnerability to terrorist attacks. The group is comprised of senior emergency management officials. They're from the District of Columbia, they're from Maryland and Virginia.

Why isn't there more diversity in the context of regional representation on that, or is there? And I'm asking this in the context of I'm trying to learn something here about how they're coordinating.

Mr. KAMOIE. The senior policy group for the District of Columbia's Urban Area Security Initiative? That is not—

Mr. PALMER. No, senior policy group. I understand they oversee the allocation and implementation of the UASI funding, and they determine the priority actions.

Mr. KAMOIE. Not nationally. So in every urban area, there's typically an urban area working group, whether a jurisdiction calls it a senior policy group or by some other name; but every urban area has a governance structure to determine the priorities among the jurisdictions. But I have no senior policy group from those jurisdictions that govern nationally what the program's priorities are.

Mr. PALMER. Well, that came from the GAO report and it indicated it was for the whole country, the whole UASI.

Mr. KAMOIE. Congressman, we'll take a look at that. I'm not familiar with that senior policy group.

Mr. PALMER. You're not familiar with the group?

Mr. KAMOIE. There is no senior policy group that sets the Urban Area Security Initiative priorities nationally. I think that is likely referring to a specific urban area jurisdiction.

Mr. PALMER. Okay. Then who does determine?

Mr. KAMOIE. So I go back to the President's preparedness policy identified 32 core capabilities that are the priorities, how this administration has defined preparedness against which all of the grant investments should be invested. They are very broad. They range from prevention capability, such as information sharing and interdiction, search and detection, all the way through to response and recovery capabilities.

So we have, as an administration, determined priorities for preparedness grant funding. We work with grantees to make sure the funds are spent against those priorities. We monitor how the funds are spent. Of course, the Department's inspector general audits grant recipients; and where we find that funds have not been used properly, we take enforcement action.

Mr. PALMER. I'm trying to figure out, though, how you make a determination that would result in Orlando and central Florida not getting a grant. Is there a ranking process? Is there a committee or is it an individual—I tell you what, for sake of time, and I've gone over my time, could you give us a report on that that outlines how this is done?

Mr. KAMOIE. Absolutely, Congressman.

Mr. PALMER. I'd appreciate that.

Mr. Chairman, you've been very generous with time. I yield back.

Mr. MICA. [Presiding.] Thank you. Appreciate your questions and participation.

Let me yield now to the Ranking Member, Mr. Lynch. Additional questions?

Mr. LYNCH. Mr. Kamoie, we're getting hung up again on the allocations and the unspent amounts. What happens, you know, so we've already—we're joining in a letter to have the inspector general look at this and see how much money has been lingering and unspent for how much time.

Obviously, if something has been sitting there for 5 years and hasn't been spent, it's probably not going to get spent. And if we could somehow reallocate to our Tier II risk jurisdictions, that might help some of the problems that we've identified here.

Mr. KAMOIE. It's why I mentioned the money to us is 1-year money. I can't reallocate it if a grant recipient doesn't spend it. I don't have the authority.

Mr. LYNCH. Well, we need to do that. We need to—we have provisions in our general transportation budget that if you don't use money, we take it back after a certain period of time. We could have a similar provision in this, in this grant program, that either puts the money back in the pot for re-issuance or automatically goes to these underserved jurisdictions that don't have the robust security apparatus that some others do.

How much control does the State have? My Governor is pretty good on this stuff, but in terms of allocation within areas, how much involvement does the State have in where to allocate the resources? Is any of that tied in with the government?

Mr. KAMOIE. In the State Homeland Security program, the Governor designates a State administrative agency and they have control over the State Homeland Security program funds. The Urban Area Security Initiative funds pass through a State, which, by statute, is allowed to keep up to 20 percent of the funding, and then passes the 80 percent down to the urban areas, who, again—

Mr. LYNCH. Are they earmarked for those urban areas?

Mr. KAMOIE. They are directed to the urban areas, yes.

Mr. LYNCH. Okay.

Mr. KAMOIE. When an award is made to Orlando, it passes through the State to Orlando.

Mr. LYNCH. And they can take 20 percent out?

Mr. KAMOIE. They can take up to 20 percent.

Mr. LYNCH. For what, administrative costs or—

Mr. KAMOIE. For activities and projects that benefit the urban area or benefit statewide.

Mr. LYNCH. I see. Okay. I have a few, some seconds left here. Any other points you want to make?

Mr. KAMOIE. I'll just go back to something you mentioned in your opening statement, Congressman, which is the guidance on the number of urban areas that the Secretary provides the funding to is critical, because Congress has a choice to make as to where the line is drawn in the top 100 Metropolitan Statistical Areas. The Congress can draw the line; they can provide discretion to the Secretary to draw the line.

Mr. LYNCH. Okay. Thank you.

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. Again, I thank you, Mr. Lynch and Mr. DeSantis, for participating, and other members today as we wind this up.

Let me go back and ask Sheriff Demings if there's any points he would like to make, having heard what has transpired and the information we have now about the program. And we'll go to Chief Mina and then Mr. Purdy.

Sheriff DEMINGS. The last comment by Mr. Kamoie I believe certainly has merit, and which some discretion should be given to the Secretary to determine where the line is drawn, because if the Secretary has discretion, perhaps the Secretary can make that—use that discretion based on current events and what is happening today and not what occurred 1, 2 or 3 years prior.

Mr. MICA. Chief Mina.

Chief MINA. Yeah. And just again, that we ask that more weight be given in the formula to the 66 million visitors. And also, I think it was important to mention that the Orlando FBI offices run out of Tampa. So that those—the investigations and intelligence received through Orlando are actually attributed to and out of the Tampa office. So we would like that to be looked at as well.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Mr. Purdy.

Mr. PURDY. I think one of the issues here is metrics, factors, formulas of risk and threat. And maybe if the Secretary of Homeland Security had more discretion, maybe some of those funds would then be able to be allocated to maybe those Tier II cities and regions that maybe need some of these things.

Congressman Lynch was spot on the money when he talked about soft targets. You know, terrorists are looking at targets. We harden stuff with UASI money and then they look at, okay, nightclubs, in Paris, a stadium, nightclubs, restaurants, a concert hall. So they're also looking to see what we're doing, and they're very adaptive. So we spend money to harden something, but we also have to think of an evolving process. And so maybe the Secretary does need more discretion, and Congress can give him that.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. Any quick comment, Mr. Kamoie?

Mr. KAMOIE. No. We look forward to continuing to work with the sheriff, with the police chief, with the Orlando community, and the other urban area jurisdictions to secure our communities.

Mr. MICA. Okay. We always have these hearings and then people wonder what's coming from it. I want to thank Mr. Lynch. He's agreed to sign on with myself. Chairman Chaffetz last night agreed to be a cosigner of a letter to the inspector general.

And we're going to ask for three things to follow up this hearing: One, we're going to ask for a review of the assessment process. Somewhere we're missing the mark. The assessment hasn't caught up with what the terrorists are doing and hitting us in these soft targets. So somehow we've got to do that.

We also have the issue of the discretion for the Secretary. We need to look at that congressionally. We do have, with the amendment that I've offered, which is in the DHS appropriations bill, some look-see from Congress, but we may want to go beyond that.

The second thing we want the inspector general to look at is the leftover money. We have money back to 2011. Maybe if you don't use it you lose it or it becomes redistributed. When I saw the chart again this morning that they had shown me when they did the final analysis, we've got about a third of the money, over a billion dollars sitting behind. That's not acceptable. These people are after us. We've got to stay ahead of them with every resource possible. It can't be sitting somewhere. So that's the second thing.

And then we've seen some wasteful spending. That last report was 2012. We want that updated. People can't waste the money. It has to be effectively expended to target our needs to combat terrorism and get the funds to the local government.

So we can't afford not to get it right here. We've got to get it right. There have been multiple Federal failures. This hearing only looks at one of them. I have a letter, and we'll make it part without objection, I hope, to Chairman Goodlatte and also to Chairman Chaffetz, to look at the elements that I don't have jurisdiction, your

subcommittee might, but under the judiciary looking at the FBI and some of the failures there: Our watch list that failed; our identification of somebody who posed a risk and months of investigation and then nothing done to track them.

So we've got to get that right. So I'm going to put in the record a letter that I submitted on June 29 to Chairman Goodlatte and also shared with Chairman Chaffetz to follow up, so we look at that.

Mr. MICA. Other items. I just wanted to put into in the record—people wonder sometimes what me, Mr. Lynch and others are doing to combat terrorism. And I got this just this week, a summary of the Homeland Security Committee. These are select counterterrorism bills. Every one of these bills, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, there must be 20 of them, I want to put this in the record. These are bills that were passed, we voted on to deal with terrorism. Unfortunately, many of them are sitting in the Senate, but we have not neglected trying to change laws and our approach from a legislative standpoint. So, without objection, I would like to put that in the record. Thank you.

Mr. MICA. And then finally, this was just released that says “for official use only,” and if we could put this in the record or refer to it, this is the 2016 allocation of Urban Security Grant funds and threat levels. This was just released a couple weeks ago. Orlando is not on the list. We've got something wrong that needs to be corrected. So we have some challenges. People are counting on us. Our Nation is under attack, our communities under attack.

Mr. MICA. I can't end the hearing without thanking my two local law enforcement guys. They have been there. Even before that attack took place in Orlando, the worst terrorist massacre since 9/11, they were there. They warned us. The Federal Government didn't hear it. And now we'll probably get hunting, we'll probably make these changes, but 49 people aren't with us and their families are suffering. And we missed the mark in Boston, we missed it in San Bernardino and others, so we've got to do a better job.

I thank every one of you, on behalf of the committee, on behalf of the Congress, for coming and testifying and working together. I am very confident we can get it right and meet this challenge.

There being no further business before the joint subcommittee hearing today, again, thank you, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 10:38 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
Bill and Report Language for FY17

Bill Language

“SEC. _____. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate, the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, at the time the President’s budget proposal for fiscal year 2018 is submitted pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, a classified report on the assessment of the relative threat, vulnerability, and consequences from acts of terrorism faced by each eligible metropolitan area, required by section 2003 of Public Law 110-53 (6 U.S.C. 604).”

Report Language

“The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 requires the Administrator of FEMA to conduct an annual assessment of the relative threat, vulnerabilities, and consequences from acts of terrorism faced by each of the 100 most populous metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) in the U.S. Based on this assessment, the Administrator designates high-risk urban areas that are eligible for UASI grants. While the factors included in this assessment are defined in statute, the specific criteria that inform these factors and the methodology used to carry out the assessment are at the discretion of the Secretary and the Administrator, who review them on an annual basis. The Committee is aware of the Secretary’s commitment to conduct a thorough review of the methodology and criteria used to support the assessment and designation of high-risk urban areas, and includes language in the bill requiring the Secretary to submit a classified report on the assessment of the relative threat, vulnerability, and consequences from acts of terrorism faced by each MSA. The Committee expects this report will reflect any changes, as appropriate, resulting from the Secretary’s review, and that the assessment outlined in the report will be applied to the risk determinations for urban areas eligible for UASI grants.”

FOUO
Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL

Relative Risk

Threat (30%) Vulnerability (20%) Consequence (50%)

Relative Risk Score				This UASI	Rank FY15	Rank Change	Rank FY16
	Min	Average	This UASI	Max			
	0.16		100	1.45	32	▼	34
Threat (30% of UASI's Risk)				This UASI	Level FY15	Change	Level FY16
Bars Represent the Percentage of UASIs in Each Threat Level	Lowest Threat <<<	30%	Highest Threat >>>	Threat Level 3	Level 3		Level 3
				Level 4	This UASI is in Threat Level 3	Level 2	Level 1
Vulnerability Index (20% of UASI's Risk)	Min	Average	This UASI	Max	This UASI	Rank FY15	Rank Change FY16
	60.00		100	62.54	42	▲	41
Targeted Infrastructure Index (10%)	0.00		100	5.75	23	▲	22
Targeted Infrastructure Assets	0		100	5	23	▲	22
Border Index (10%)	0.00		100	3.15	37		37
Land Crossings (0)	0		100	2,715,506	20	▲	19
Air Crossings (2,715,469)	2,715,469		100	2,715,469			
Water Crossings (37)	37		100	37			
International Waters	0		100	No			
International Borders	0		100	No			
Consequence Index (50% of UASI's Risk)	Min	Average	This UASI	Max	This UASI	Rank FY15	Rank Change FY16
	0.51		100	4.78	35	▲	34
Population Index (30%)	0.08		100	1.13	30		30
Census	558,263		100	2,321,418	29	▲	28
Commuters	58,220		100	489,692	25	▲	24
Daily Visitors	18,508		100	580,314	1		1
Population x Density	1,421		100	19,385	30		30
Economic Index (13%)	1.31		100	10.39	32		32
Gross Domestic Product (\$M)	\$143,794 M		100	\$115,927 M	32		32
National Infrastructure Index (5%)	0.00		100	6.77	43	▲	39
Level 1 Assets	0		100	0	27	▲	17
Level 2 Assets	0		100	9	37	▼	38
National Security Index (2%)	0.30		100	15.14	32	▼	33
Military Personnel	663		100	6,650	57		57
DIB Facilities	0		100	3	20		20

WARNING: This document is FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO). It contains information that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.G. 552). It is to be controlled, stored, handled, transmitted, distributed, and disposed of in accordance with DHS policy relating to FOUO information and is not to be released to the public or other personnel who do not have a valid "need-to-know" without prior approval of an authorized DHS official.

FOUO UASI Risk Profile Key Terms and Definitions																																															
<p><i>This Risk Profile details the risk data elements for Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL and how they compare across the other UASIs considered in the risk analysis. The following key terms are useful for understanding this Risk Profile:</i></p>																																															
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U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20472



FEMA

February 19, 2016

The Honorable John L. Mica
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Mica:

Thank you for your January 27, 2016 letter. On January 4, 2016, the Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, Florida (Orlando) Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) was provided a draft risk profile with the opportunity to comment and provide additional information. As stated in your letter, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) received a response from the Orange County Sheriff's Office and Chief of Police for Orlando regarding the Orlando MSA's draft risk profile. As FEMA's Assistant Administrator for Grant Programs, I am responding on Secretary Johnson's behalf.

In implementing the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) program, and pursuant to provisions of Title XX of the *Homeland Security Act of 2002*, as amended (Pub. L. No. 107-296), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is required to direct funding to the Nation's highest risk urban areas. Per the legislation, DHS conducts an annual risk assessment of the 100 most populous MSAs based on relative threat, vulnerability, and consequence factors. The results of the risk assessment inform UASI eligibility and funding allocation decisions. In order to conduct a relative risk assessment of the 100 most populous MSAs, DHS must utilize data sources which contribute to a consistent and repeatable methodology.

FEMA understands the concern regarding the year-over-year change in rank for the Orlando MSA. However, please note that the ranks are based on each MSA's risk score and the ranks displayed on the Risk Profile are helpful for assessing relative position, but cannot be solely relied on to understand changes in relative risk. Ranks are provided for illustrative purposes only; they are not used in calculating risk scores. Threat, Vulnerability, and Consequence (TVC) scores are multiplied together to calculate risk, irrespective of ranks. TVC scores are based on the combination of index scores (e.g., Population Index, Economic Index, etc.). The scores within the individual indices are used to calculate the overall MSA risk score and rank and are combined according to the weights (percentages) listed on the Risk Profile. The rank within the indices are only to illustrate how a particular MSA ranked within that index compared to the other MSAs. Index rankings cannot be used to calculate the overall risk score and rank for an MSA.

The Orlando MSA decreased by two risk ranks in Fiscal year (FY) 2016 due to relative increases in other MSA's risk scores that allowed them to overtake the Orlando MSA's risk score.

The Honorable John L. Mica
 February 19, 2016
 Page 2

*Boarded
 Chicago San Bruno
 Boston
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DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) uses a holistic approach to analyze threat information and juxtaposes its review of Intelligence community (IC) disseminated reporting with information provided by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) which incorporates information from FBI field offices. For the FY 2016 grant cycle, I&A assessed Orlando to be in threat level 3, which indicates that "international and domestic terrorists, and homegrown violent extremists, *may have* the intent to attack these particular cities and states."

I&A included a review of IC disseminated threat reporting from August 2013 through November 2015 to supplement FBI information. The use of this timeframe allowed I&A to capture the current threat reporting while recognizing the dynamic nature of the homeland threat environment. Reporting prior to this timeframe is outside the scope of the analysis. Reporting after this timeframe will be considered for incorporation in the threat analysis that is used in future iterations of the grants process.

Threat analysis does not include the notional potential attractiveness of a target to a possible terrorist, or the consequences of any attack to infrastructure within a particular jurisdiction. These aspects fall outside the scope of the threat analysis, but would be captured in the other aspects of the risk formula.

Identification and prioritization of critical infrastructure—the destruction or disruption of which could have catastrophic national or regional consequences—provides the foundation for infrastructure protection and risk reduction programs and activities executed by the Department of Homeland Security and its public and private sector partners. Historically, DHS has fulfilled this responsibility through the National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program (NCIPP), through an annual data call to sector, state, and territorial partners. The data call is based on criteria developed by National Protection and Programs Directorate's Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis and is conducted in accordance with the *Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007* (Pub. L. No. 110-53).

The resulting NCIPP Level 1 and Level 2 List prioritizes those assets, systems, and clusters whose destruction or disruption could result in catastrophic national or regional consequences. The potential consequences of a disruptive or destructive event are evaluated in the same way across the country, to assure consistency through the application of standard criteria. Urban areas are encouraged to work with their State Homeland Security Advisors to identify and nominate infrastructure meeting the NCIPP criteria during the next NCIPP data call. The FY 2017 NCIPP data call will occur in March and April of 2016 and the results will inform the FY 2017 risk profiles.

The information regarding specific infrastructure is too sensitive to include in this response however many of the infrastructure assets noted in your letter are included on the NCIPP Level 1 and Level 2 List and factored into the FEMA Risk Profiles. FEMA uses a data source for the visitor data that is consistent across all states and MSAs. The visitors reported on the Risk Profile indicate the average number of domestic visitors to the state or MSA during one day in the three year period from 2011, 2012, and 2013. The FY 2016 visitor information data source is D.K. Shifflet & Associates, which uses a survey of U.S. domestic travel behavior. According to

The Honorable John L. Mica
February 19, 2016
Page 3

the data used by FEMA for the visitor component of the Population Index, the Orlando MSA had 580,314 domestic visitors present on an average day in the years 2011-2013 (the years of the latest data from D.K. Shifflet & Associates). This is equivalent to 211 million visitor-days spent by domestic visitors in the MSA per year. The Orlando MSA was ranked first in FY 2016 for daily visitors across all 100 MSAs.

FEMA is continuing to pursue more robust data sources that would account for all visitors to states and MSAs and would include both domestic and international visitors. This includes discussions which FEMA has had with the Department of Commerce's National Travel and Tourism Office to obtain international visitor data that provides a consistent comparison across all states and MSAs. As comparable visitor data is not available uniformly for all urban areas, using it in FEMA calculations would not allow for consistent comparison of visitor numbers across MSAs.

In recent years, FEMA has collaborated with our Customs and Border Protection (CBP) partners to expand the Border Index within the risk formula. Similar to FY 2014, the Border Index for the FY 2016 grant cycle again includes crossings by air and water in addition to those by land. The number of border crossings is provided by the CBP Office of Field Operations / Planning, Program Analysis, and Evaluation includes crossings of international borders into the United States by train, bus, commercial truck, personal vehicle, pedestrian, ferries and other waterborne vessels, and both commercial and private aircraft.


Since the UASI risk formula is relative in nature, an MSA's ranking in both overall risk and individual data elements (Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Population, Visitors, Commuters, Military Personnel, Critical Infrastructure, etc.) is also dependent on any changes of other MSA's individual data elements and overall risk. For example, one MSA, previously ranked lower than Orlando but now ranked higher in the FY 2016 draft risk profiles, experienced an increase of the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis estimated GDP which is almost double the increase for Orlando. Such changes in individual data elements can result in a relatively higher risk score for another MSA. This is how Orlando's data elements and risk scores may appear to be stable while its ranks may experience change.

The Consequence Index in the risk methodology includes GDP of the MSA in the calculation of the Economic Index. The Orlando GDP includes all economic activity occurring in its MSA area including that from tourism, airport and transit activities, border crossing, research and universities, and industrial activities. The economic data considered in the risk analysis does not prioritize economic activity from one sector over any other. Instead, the GDP is used as a universal comparison of the size of state and MSA economies.

The Honorable John L. Mica
February 19, 2016
Page 4

I appreciate your interest in the FY 2016 Risk Validation Process and look forward to working with you on future homeland security issues. Representative Webster, who co-signed your letter, will receive a separate, identical response. If you have further questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,



Brian E. Kamoie
Assistant Administrator for Grant Programs

CC: Gracia Szczech, Region IV Administrator
Sharrie Abrams, Region IV Grants Division Director

JOHN L. MICA
7TH DISTRICT, FLORIDA

www.Mica.house.gov
www.facebook.com/JohnMica

COMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION
AND PUBLIC ASSETS
CHAIRMAN
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives

Washington, DC 20515-0907
June 29, 2016

The Honorable Bob Goodlatte
Chairman
House Judiciary Committee
2309 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Bob:


In the aftermath of the Orlando terrorist attack, I'm following up my request to the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (OGR) to conduct a thorough review of the federal failures with a related request of you, as Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, to exercise your jurisdiction in this matter. It is important that Congress conduct a thorough investigation, hold hearings and take corrective action. As you know, while OGR has broad investigative authority, your Committee authorizes the Department of Justice and its programs. Failures of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other agencies in Orlando, San Bernardino and Boston demand extensive oversight, hearings and possible corrective legislative action.

As Chairman of the Transportation and Public Assets Oversight Subcommittee with jurisdiction over the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), we have been investigating the failures of FEMA and the Department of Homeland Security to properly assess the terrorist threats in Orlando under the Urban Area Security Initiative program.

I write today to request you also give your Committee's attention to this important matter of national security. I stand ready to cooperate with you and your Committee in any way possible.

Thank you for your attention to this request. If you or your staff have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me or my Deputy Chief of Staff, Sean McMaster, at 202-225-4035.

With my regards and best wishes, I remain,

Sincerely,

John L. Mica
Member of Congress

Cc: Shelley Husband, Chief of Staff, House Committee on the Judiciary



HOUSE HOMELAND SECURITY COMMITTEE: SELECT COUNTERTERRORISM BILLS

HR 3503 – DHS Support to Fusion Centers Act: Enhances intelligence cooperation and threat awareness in communities, including by ensuring state and local law enforcement have appropriate security clearances (Rep. McSally) – **IN SENATE**

HR 3598 – Fusion Center Enhancement Act: Streamlines and enhances information sharing and counterterrorism cooperation with state and local law enforcement nationwide and bolsters fusion centers (Rep. Barletta) – **IN SENATE**

HR 4239 – Tracking Foreign Fighters in Terrorist Safe Havens Act: Increases intelligence community focus on foreign fighter travel to/from emerging terrorist safe havens, not just Syria and Iraq (Rep. Lobiano) – **IN SENATE**

HR 4240 – No Fly for Foreign Fighters Act: Requires comprehensive review of the terror watchlist to ensure past weaknesses have been fixed and to identify other vulnerabilities. (Rep. Jackson-Lee) – **IN SENATE**

HR 4314 – Counterterrorism Screening and Assistance Act: Quickly equips U.S. allies and high-risk countries with key counterterrorism tools (e.g. watchlisting/screening) for stopping terrorist travel and allows Administration to suspend foreign aid to countries who don't close security gaps (Rep. Zeldin) – **IN SENATE**

HR 4401 – Amplifying Local Efforts to Root out Terror (ALERT) Act: "Scales-up" efforts to counter terrorist recruitment nationwide by allowing the government to better use existing fusion centers for outreach (Rep. Loudermilk) – **IN SENATE**

HR 4402 – Foreign Fighter Review Act: Requires top-to-bottom Administration review of instances where Americans became foreign fighters; requirement to identify and close security gaps (Rep. Hurd) – **IN SENATE**

HR 4403 – Enhancing Overseas Traveler Vetting Act: Authorizes DHS and State to develop and provide new watchlisting/screening technologies to foreign governments (Rep. Hurd) – **IN SENATE**

HR 4404 – Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel Exercise Act: Requires a national-level exercise to be held on the terror-travel threat to identify security vulnerabilities (Rep. McSally) – **IN SENATE**

HR 4407 – Counterterrorism Advisory Board Act: Establishes the central counterterrorism decision making body at DHS and sets the procedures for issuing terrorism alerts (Rep. Katko) – **IN SENATE**

HR 4408 – National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel Act: Requires a U.S. national strategy on combating terrorist travel—for the first time in a decade—and requires future administrations to put forward regular action plans for fixing U.S. vulnerabilities to terrorist infiltration (Rep. Katko) – **IN SENATE**

HR 4509 – State and High-Risk Area Working Group Act: Better integrates state and local law enforcement and first responders into decision-making about state, regional, and local homeland security plans (Rep. Payne) – **IN SENATE**

HR 4820 – Combating Terrorist Recruitment Act: Requires DHS to use the testimonials of former extremists to fight back against terrorist recruiting of Americans (Rep. Fleischmann) – **IN SENATE**

HR 5471 – Countering Terrorist Radicalization Act: Combines three previously passed Homeland Security Committee counterterrorism bills to ramp up efforts to stop Islamist terrorist groups from radicalizing Americans and to combat their propaganda (Rep. McCaul) – **IN SENATE**

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FY 2016 UASI Allocation and Threat Levels

MSA	FY 16	
	Allocation	Threat Level
New York-White Plains, NY	\$ 178,623,000	1
Chicago-Naperville-Elgin, IL-IN-WI	\$ 68,610,000	1
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Glendale, CA	\$ 68,610,000	1
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV	\$ 53,309,000	1
San Francisco-San Jose-Oakland, CA	\$ 28,036,000	2
Houston-The Woodlands-Sugar Land, TX	\$ 23,693,000	2
Newark-Jersey City-New Brunswick, NJ-PA	\$ 20,534,000	2
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD	\$ 18,263,000	2
Boston-Cambridge-Newton, MA-NH	\$ 17,770,000	2
San Diego-Carlsbad, CA	\$ 16,658,000	2
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX	\$ 15,302,000	2
Anaheim-Santa Ana-Irvine, CA	\$ 5,430,000	2
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA	\$ 5,430,000	2
Detroit-Warren-Dearborn, MI	\$ 5,430,000	2
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-West Palm Beach, FL	\$ 5,430,000	2
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI	\$ 5,430,000	2
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ	\$ 5,430,000	2
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA	\$ 5,430,000	2
Baltimore-Columbia-Towson, MD	\$ 2,962,000	3
Charlotte-Concord-Gastonia, NC-SC	\$ 2,962,000	2
Cleveland-Elyria, OH	\$ 2,962,000	2
Denver-Aurora-Lakewood, CO	\$ 2,962,000	2
Las Vegas-Henderson-Paradise, NV	\$ 2,962,000	2
Pittsburgh, PA	\$ 2,962,000	2
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro, OR-WA	\$ 2,962,000	2
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA	\$ 2,962,000	2
Sacramento-Roseville-Arden-Arcade, CA	\$ 2,962,000	2
St. Louis, MO-IL	\$ 2,962,000	2
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL	\$ 2,962,000	3
Total	\$ 580,000,000	

Released

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